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INTRODUCTION

Charitable subsidies are supposed to encourage positive externalities from charity.' In principle, the government can pursue this goal
by evaluating specific charitable initiatives and deciding how much
each should receive. Although the government sometimes makes this
sort of fine-grained judgment, 2 this Article focuses on two income tax
rules that leave the government essentially no discretion about which
charities to fund: the deduction for donations to charity ("the deduction") 3 and the exemption of a charity's investment income ("the ex1 A positive externality is a benefit to a third party. Positive Externalities, http://www
.economicsonline.co.uk/marketfailures/positive-externalities.html
(last visited June 7,
2018).
2 For instance, various government agencies solicit and evaluate grant proposals. Advance Approval of Grant-Making Procedures, https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/private-foundations/advance-approval-of-grant-making-procedures (last visited June 7, 2018).
3 The charitable deduction generally allows donors to avoid paying tax on amounts they
give to charity. See IRC § 170. For example, if a taxpayer earns $1 million of salary and
contributes $100,000 to charity, she pays tax on only $900,000. If her tax rate is 37%, this
contribution of $100,000 reduces her tax by $37,000.
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flow automatically as
emption"). 4 With each subsidy, federal dollars
5
criteria.
general
very
satisfy
long as charities
As a result, these subsidies are especially important when political
institutions are deadlocked. Even if the government is too divided to
address an issue, nonprofits can still do so with government money.
Indeed, the federal government invests billions of dollars each year in
6
these subsidies.
But although these subsidies loom large today, they could change
tomorrow. In 2017, Congress scaled each of them back, to some extent. The charitable deduction is not quite as widely available or as
generous as it was. 7 Likewise, the exemption was scaled back for
4 The exemption spares charities from paying tax on their income from passive investments, such as bonds and publicly-traded stock. IRC § 501(a) (excluding the income of
§ 501(c)(3) organizations from tax). For example, a charity that earns $100,000 of interest
on bonds it holds does not pay tax on this income, thereby avoiding the 21% corporate tax
that otherwise would apply. See IRC § 11.
5 When a tax rule is called a "subsidy," the tax burden differs from what it otherwise
would be under a "regular" regime. In describing the exemption as a subsidy, this Article
assumes that the baseline regime is an income tax, not a consumption tax. Otherwise, the
exemption of a charity's investment income obviously would not be a subsidy, since the
investment returns of all taxpayers would be exempt under a consumption tax. Likewise,
in describing the deduction as a subsidy, this Article assumes that taxpayers otherwise
would be taxed on resources they give away. Compare William D. Andrews, Personal
Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 309 (1972) (money a taxpayer gives
away should not be considered her income), with Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions
Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a
Far from Ideal World, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 831 (1979) (giving money away is something a
taxpayer chooses to do, so this money should be considered her income).
6 According to the Treasury department's 2017 estimate, the charitable deduction will
cost the Treasury $63.14 billion in 2018 (using a 35% rate, instead of a 21% rate, to calculate the revenue loss from corporate contributions). U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Office of Tax
Analysis, Tax Expenditures (Oct. 16, 2017), at 23, 24, 34, http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/tax-policy/Documents/Tax-Expenditures-FY2019.pdf.
Neither the Treasury nor the Joint Committee on Taxation estimates the revenue loss
from the exemption. This Article offers a rough estimate of $48 billion for 2013, using the
35% rate in effect then, which would be approximately $28 billion using the 21% rate in
effect now. See text accompanying note 46. Notably, the Congressional Research Service
estimated that the revenue loss for 2014 from excluding university endowment income was
$16.2 billion. Molly F. Sherlock, College and University Endowments: Overview and Tax
Policy Options, Cong. Research Serv. 3 (Dec. 2, 2015), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44293
.pdf (assuming a 35% corporate rate). This estimate includes only endowments from universities, not from religious institutions, museums, hospitals, cultural institutions, social
services organizations, and other nonprofits.
7 To claim the charitable deduction, taxpayers must itemize. But the number of
itemizers is likely to decline because one itemized deduction that was significant for many
taxpayers-the deduction for state and local taxes-was capped at $10,000. IRC
§ 164(b)(6)(B). At the same time, the standard deduction was increased significantly (for
example, to $24,000 for married couples). IRC § 63(c)(7). For those who still claim the
charitable deduction, its value declined along with the top marginal rate (for example,
from 39.6% to 37% for individuals and from 35% to 21% for corporations). See IRC §§ 1,
11.
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some universities, which now pay a 1.4% tax on endowment income.8
The enactment of these modest changes suggests that, for better or
worse, more significant changes could also attract political support.
To decide whether changes would be advisable, these subsidies'
strengths and weaknesses should be compared. Both rules delegate
key decisions to private individuals, but they create very different incentives and effects. As other commentators have emphasized, they
vary in their impact on the timing of a charity's spending. 9 In addition, this Article breaks new ground in showing their different effects
on the governance of nonprofits. On this dimension, the deduction
has three advantages over the exemption.
First, the deduction uses a more reliable test for determining
whether a charity should receive government funding: The donor has
to give her own money. This "skin in the game" signals confidence in
the charity's mission and effectiveness. 10 Admittedly, contributions
are not unassailable evidence of a charity's value, since donors sometimes have idiosyncratic preferences or incomplete information. But
donations still are a meaningful signal.
In contrast, the exemption is triggered by investment income, not
by donations. To benefit from the exemption, a charity needs a surplus to invest. Yet a surplus is not always evidence of social value; for
example, it is a positive signal when it derives from a surge in donations, but not when a charity scales back operations because its mission ceases to be relevant.
A second advantage of the deduction is that it empowers donors to
monitor nonprofit managers; in contrast, the exemption can undercut
this monitoring. The problem is that the exemption offers tax-free
returns only to charities, and not to individual donors. To the extent
that donors cannot find other ways to earn a tax-free return, the exemption encourages them to turn over assets to charities ("endowment gifts"), instead of keeping these assets and making annual gifts
of the investment return ("spendable gifts").
This front-loading of contributions either reduces a donor's influence or imposes other costs. If a donor gives an endowment to an
8 IRC § 4968(a) (imposing a 1.4% tax on universities with more than 500 tuition-paying
students, whose endowments are more than $500,000 per student).
9 See, e.g., Daniel Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for Charities a Subsidy?, 64 Tax
L. Rev. 283, 284 (2011) ("Income tax exemption, in most circumstances, will affect only the
relative cost of setting aside funds for the future as compared to providing current benefits."); Brian Galle, Pay It Forward? Law and the Problem of Restricted Spending Philanthropy, 93 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1143, 1153 (2016) ("Restricted-spending policies defer
charitable good deeds into the future. How should policy makers compare charity now
against the benefit of charity later?").
10 See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives, Information, and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 Tax L. Rev. 221 (2009).
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operating charity, such as a university or a museum, she cannot redirect this money to another charity, even if she develops doubts about
the charity's mission or management. Alternatively, if a donor gives
the endowment to a grant-making charity that she can influence, such
as a private foundation or a donor advised fund, she avoids committing to a particular operating charity, but faces other costs, such as
taxes, managerial fees, and agency costs (for example, when foundation managers disregard donor preferences in making grants).
In contrast, unlike endowment gifts, spendable gifts allow donors to
make fresh judgments about charities every year. Like "staged financing" in venture capital, spendable gifts allow funders to demand resuits before writing another check.1 1 To be clear, spendable gifts are
not always better, since endowments offer offsetting advantages, such
as stability for multi-year initiatives. But this Article identifies a governance cost when the tax law puts a thumb on the scale for endowments, as the exemption currently does.
Third, in favoring endowments, the exemption exacerbates another
governance problem, which is more familiar: cumbersome or stale
limits on endowments. Since donors anticipate losing influence after
giving an endowment, they often impose contractual restrictions,
which can become outdated as circumstances change, and can be difficult (or even impossible) to revise.
Notwithstanding these three governance advantages of the deduction over the exemption, the exemption still has two offsetting advantages, which are well understood. First, it spares charities from
making tax-motivated investment decisions. Second, and relatedly,
the exemption ensures that the tax law is neutral about whether a
charity spends or saves. Because the exemption allows charities to
save tax-free, they do not have a tax incentive to spend now, instead
of saving for the future.
In my view, these advantages of the exemption need to be balanced
against the three governance disadvantages discussed above (use of
investment income, instead of donations, as a trigger; less effective
donor monitoring; and stale restrictions). There is no perfect way to
balance these competing considerations, but two alternative approaches are promising.
First, Congress could repeal the exemption, or at least scale it back.
In subsidizing charity, Congress could rely more on the deduction,
which avoids the governance disadvantages emphasized in this Article. Admittedly, the deduction is not perfect, especially under current
law. For instance, it is more generous to taxpayers in high brackets,
11 See Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure:
A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 874 (2003).
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and to those who donate appreciated property. Fortunately, these
(and other) familiar flaws under current law are not inherent in subsidizing donations, and could be addressed with responses that I (and
others) have addressed elsewhere. 12 For example, the deduction
could be replaced with a tax credit, which provides the same government match to both low- and high-income donors,'13 and special tax
benefits for contributions of appreciated property could be eliminated. 14 Since these responses are well understood, this Article does
not rehash them. Instead, this Article focuses on the general advantages of subsidizing donations, instead of endowment income.
Second, if Congress wishes to preserve the exemption, there is another way to mitigate two of the governance issues emphasized here:
weaker donor monitoring and stale restrictions. The core problem is
that the exemption creates a tax advantage for endowment gifts over
spendable gifts-since charities earn tax-free returns, while donors do
not-but endowment gifts limit the ability of donors to adjust to
changed circumstances. To claim the tax benefit, donors either have
to surrender control over the endowment (if they give it to an operating charity) or incur other costs (if they give it to a private foundation
or donor-advised fund). Another way to address these issues, then, is
to make it easier for donors to earn tax-free returns for charities on
their own, so they feel less pressure to turn over assets to operating
charities. For instance, Congress could liberalize the rules for private
foundations and donor advised funds. But admittedly, there are risks
in this approach. For example, wider use of private foundations could
turn control of more assets over to unaccountable foundation managers. In a sense, efforts to mitigate agency costs in operating charities
could end up exacerbating agency costs in private foundations. We
need to pick our poison, or at least to strike the right balance between
these goals.
While others have analyzed the exemption, this Article breaks new
ground in three ways. First, this Article focuses on a criterion that has
largely been overlooked in the literature on the exemption: the effect
on nonprofit governance. Second, this Article is unique in comparing
the governance implications of two subsidies: the deduction and the
exemption. Although these subsidies are similar in many respects,
their effects on nonprofit governance differ in important ways, which
are new to the literature. Third, although others have criticized the
12See, e.g., Schizer, note 10; Daniel Halperin, A Charitable Contribution of Appreciated Property and the Realization of Built-In Gains, 56 Tax L. Rev. 1 (2002).
13Schizer, note 10, at 246.
14 Halperin, note 12, at 10.
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exemption, the criticisms here are markedly different. In some cases,
they directly contradict the arguments of other commentators.
For example, in a forthcoming article, Edward Zelinsky also criticizes the exemption, but for very different reasons. He wants to tax
endowment income because charities use public services, have the
ability to pay, and resemble other institutions that pay tax on investment income, such as for-profit firms. 15 Yet his argument does not
address what, in my view, is the main case for exempting a charity's
investment income: positive externalities from charity. Zelinsky dismisses this consideration, arguing that other taxpayers also use money
for good purposes, "creating jobs, raising families, [and] making investments," but still have to pay tax. 16 Since Zelinsky rejects the idea
that charities are different (that is, in systematically generating positive externalities), he does not consider the main question I address:
If Congress wishes to subsidize charity, without choosing which specific charities to support, does it matter whether it uses the exemption
or the deduction?
Like Zelinsky, Daniel Halperin also does not focus on nonprofit
governance. For him, the decisive issue is whether the tax law should
influence the timing of a charity's spending. 17 In my view, it is better
for the tax law not to influence this choice. Since the exemption accomplishes this neutrality by allowing charities to save tax-free, I consider this neutrality to be the strongest justification for the exemption.
But Halperin draws the opposite conclusion. He wants to repeal the
exemption in order to encourage current spending. 18 Halperin claims
that nonprofit managers have self-interested reasons to save, and he
wants the tax law to counter this alleged bias. 19 In response, I argue
that the opposite bias-a bias against saving-is just as plausible for
nonprofit managers, even though it has been overlooked in the litera15 Edward A. Zelinsky, Section 4968 and Taxing All Charitable Endowments:

A Cri-

tique and a Proposal, 38 Va. Tax Rev. (forthcoming 2018).
16 Id. manuscript at 53 ("taxation invariably involves taking from the public fisc money
which taxpayers would themselves use for good purposes--creating jobs, raising families,
making investments.").
17 Halperin, note 9, at 286 ("[E]xemption should depend on a value judgement as to
whether public policy should favor less accumulation and relatively more current spending
by charities.").
18 Daniel Halperin, Tax Policy and Endowments-Is Excessive Accumulation Subsidized? (Part II), 67 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 125, 125 (2011) (arguing that endowment accumulation is excessive and discussing ways to discourage accumulation of endowments);
see also Galle, note 9, at 1159 ("I show that short-term spending can have long-lasting
impact, that future charitable spending is likely to be less valuable because the growing
philanthropic sector will have to turn to lower priority projects, and that spreading spending out over time introduces several different forms of agency and information costs.").
19 Daniel Halperin, Tax Policy and Endowments-Is Excessive Accumulation Subsidized?, 67 Exempt Tax Org. Tax Rev. 17, 20 (2011) ("donors, trustees, and key employees
may be biased in favor of accumulation").
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ture. Arguably, a manager's reputation is enhanced more by spending
(for example, on new initiatives, construction projects, and the like)
than by setting aside resources for successors to spend. In other
words, although Halperin and I both express reservations about the
exemption, our reservations are very different. His main reason to
repeal the exemption is, in my view, the best argument for keeping it.
Part II of this Article emphasizes a key similarity between the charitable deduction and exemption: The government plays essentially no
role in deciding how much each charity receives. Parts III and IV
highlight governance advantages of the deduction over the exemption,
while Part V analyzes what, as noted above, I consider the best justification for the exemption: neutrality about whether charities should
spend or save. Part VI discusses distribution and deadweight loss,
showing that these factors generally do not favor either subsidy. Part
VII sums up this Article's policy implications: Either the exemption
should be scaled back, or donors should have a greater ability to earn
tax-free returns for charities on their own.
II.

Two

NONDISCRETIONARY SUBSIDIEs:

PRIVATE ALLOCATION

OF PUBLIC FuNDs

At one level, the rationale for subsidizing charities is straightforward: their activities produce positive externalities. To keep these social benefits from being undersupplied, the marginal subsidy should
equal the marginal positive externalities from the subsidized activity.
In a world of perfect information and no transaction costs, the
mechanism for delivering the subsidy would not matter. The subsidy
should be $1,000 if the relevant activity generated $1,000, but it would
not matter whether this $1,000 was offered as a grant, a match for
donations from third parties, or an exemption of the charity's investment income. Yet the very fact that a subsidy is needed-so externalities are not reflected in market prices-means that information is
imperfect and transaction costs are positive. Just as information and
incentive problems create the need for a subsidy, they also lend significance to how it is delivered.
An important threshold question, which this Part analyzes, is how
active the government should be in deciding which causes to fund. In
20
most government programs, Congress chooses how money is spent.
20 In addition to setting the budgets of government agencies, Congress chooses which
charities to fund when making grants (which represented 8% of public charities' revenue in
2013) and paying fees (which represented another 8%). Brice McKeever, The Nonprofit
Sector in Brief, 2015, Urb. Inst. 4-5 (Oct. 2015), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/
alfresco/publication-pdfs/2000497-The-Nonprofit-Sector-in-Brief-2015-Pubic-CharitiesGiving-and-Volunteering.pdf.
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In contrast, with the deduction and exclusion, the government plays a
much more modest role. These subsidies leave key decisions to private parties. This Article's principal claim is that they do so in different ways, which have divergent effects on the governance of
nonprofits.
Yet before turning to these differences-a discussion that begins in
Part II-this Part offers a more precise account of why and how the
deduction and exemption delegate these choices under current law.
First, why should any of these decisions be delegated, instead of made
by government officials? What are the advantages and costs of doing
so? Second, which choices are delegated and who makes these
choices? Third, how do the deduction and exemption accomplish
these delegations? These issues are considered in turn.
A.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Delegating Allocations
to Private Parties

Why does Congress rely on private parties, instead of government
officials, to allocate the deduction and exemption? The government's
limited role is a feature, not a bug, which has familiar advantages and
disadvantages.
1.

Advantages of Not Relying on Government Officials to Allocate
Subsidy

Four advantages are commonly invoked. First, the lack of government control allows operating charities to be more flexible and nimble. They can be launched quickly. If conditions change, charities do
not need government approval to adjust priorities and strategies.
Second, for the same reason, operating charities are independent
politically. Even if there is no political consensus for its mission, the
nonprofit is still able to tap government funds. 21 Unlike legislatures,
nonprofits can advance causes that are "cutting edge" and have not
(yet) attracted the median voter's support. It is no accident that civil
rights, women's rights, and environmentalism all began in nonprofits.
The government did not embrace these causes until popular support
22
became more widespread.
Third, the independence of nonprofits allows them to fill gaps when
direct government involvement would compromise important values.
21 Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three
Sector Economy, in The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions 21, 30-31 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986) (defending charitable deduction as empowering minorities to pursue public goals that majoritarian political processes would not endorse).
22 Schizer, note 10, at 229.
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For instance, the government should not choose which religions to
support. The same is true of newspapers, since they are supposed to
monitor (and criticize) the government. 23 For these institutions, charitable subsidies offer government funding without government control.
Fourth, since operating charities do not depend on the good will of
government officials, they are freer to compete with the government-and each other-to develop the best solutions. In promoting
competition, nonprofits function like for-profit firms, enhancing quality, imposing discipline, and promoting innovation. Admittedly, the
government can simulate this competition on their own, at least to an
extent, by tasking different agencies or levels of government to act
independently. For this reason, Brian Galle argues that charitable
subsidies are more useful for missions that state and local governments cannot undertake. 24 Yet even when there is some competition
already, the charitable sector can add more.
2.

Disadvantagesof Not Relying on Government Officials to
Allocate Subsidy

Although the lack of substantive government oversight offers these
advantages, it has four familiar downsides as well. First, the government provides no coordination. When separate operating charities
pursue overlapping missions, they might duplicate effort and forgo
economies of scale. Likewise, each donor decides what to support
25
without full information about what others are supporting.
Second, the government does not provide quality control. Rather,
donors are free to support-and direct public money to-misguided
causes and poorly run organizations.
Third, some commentators question the legitimacy of relying on private individuals to allocate public money, instead of democratically
elected representatives. 26 Yet although Congress does not allocate
these funds itself, it has authorized the way they are allocated by en23 David M. Schizer, Subsidizing the Press, 3 J. Legal Anal. 1 (2011).
24 Brian Galle, The Role of Charity in a Federal System, 53 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 777
(2012). Likewise, Eric Posner and Anup Malani have argued that for-profit corporations
should also be tasked with pursuing public goals, and arguably should be subsidized when
they do so, since they have the advantages of equity capital and the discipline associated
with the profit motive. Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charity, 93
Va. L. Rev. 2017 (2007). In fact, a charitable subsidy for for-profit firms is more feasible
than Posner and Malani seem to suggest. For instance, foundations can make grants to forprofit firms as long as the grant has "expenditure responsibility" language requiring the
for-profit to use the funding solely for a specified charitable purpose and to account for the
way it uses the funds.
25 Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 387 (1998).
26 Ilan Benshalom, The Dual Subsidy Theory of Charitable Deductions, 84 Ind. L.J.
1047 (2009).
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acting the relevant subsidies. Delegating the allocation of funds is not
an unusual step for Congress. Agencies have some discretion over
their budgets, panels of experts allocate some grants, and the like. A
related process-based concern is that wealthy people exert disproportionate control over charitable subsidies, since they have the capacity
to make larger contributions. 27 Yet more modest donors still have influence in the aggregate-since large numbers of small gifts add up to
significant dollars, and thus meaningful influence. Therefore, a nonprofit manager would be reluctant to alienate large numbers of small
donors merely to placate a single large donor. In any event, although
large donors still wield disproportionate influence, this issue is not
unique to charity. For instance, through campaign contributions,
wealthy people also have added influence with elected officials.
Fourth, the influence of wealthy donors raises concerns about outcomes, as well as process. If these donors have idiosyncratic preferences, they may route public money to causes that lack mainstream
appeal. For instance, wealthy donors give less to religious organizations than other Americans, and more to cultural and educational institutions. 28 Even so, wealthy people are not monolithic in supporting
particular causes. George Soros funds some causes that the Koch
brothers oppose, and vice versa. Wealthy people have values and
preferences as diverse as the public at large.
Needless to say, commentators weigh these competing costs and
benefits differently. Some are enthusiastic about delegating key decisions to private decisionmakers, 29 while others are skeptical. 30 Likewise, commentators also disagree about the effectiveness of the main
alternative-relying on government officials-since the government is
influenced by interest groups and has limited information and
31
expertise.
27 Id. at 1068 (critiquing deduction for "delegating to well-off donors an almost exclusive
privileged-patrician status to allocate public finds").
28 James Andreoni, Philanthropy 50-51 (2004), http://econweb.ucsd.edu/-jandreon/Work
ingPapers/Philanthropy.pdf.
29 See, e.g., Weisbrod, note 6, at 30-31 (praising charitable deduction for funding preferences and innovative ideas of non-median voter).
30 See Galle, note 24, at 812 (arguing that state and local governments often are a better
mechanism than nonprofits to implement preferences of non-median voter).
31 Compare, e.g., Joseph Stiglitz, The Great Divide: Unequal Societies and What We
Can Do About Them (2015) (advocating robust role for government to address inequality), and Paul Krugman, End This Depression Nowl (2012) (urging government spending
to stimulate economy), with Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public
Goods and the Theory of Groups (1971) (cautioning about influence of concentrated interest groups on government policy), and Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among
Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. Econ. 371 (1983) (analyzing deadweight
loss caused by interest group influence on policy, and dynamics involved in countering it).
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Even so, skeptics and enthusiasts should agree that if the government is going to rely on private individuals instead of government officials to make key decisions about these subsidies, this delegation
should be implemented in ways that promote better private decisionmaking. In other words, in addition to routing money to nonprofits,
these subsidies ideally should also promote better nonprofit governance by empowering decisionmakers with the right incentives and
information.
B.

Which Decisions Are Delegated and Who Makes Them?

To compare the deduction and exemption on this dimension, the
first step is to specify which choices are made by private parties, and
who those private parties are. For both subsidies, the delegated
choices are the same, as are the private decisionmakers: beneficiaries,
donors, the board, and managers. Yet the influence of these groups
varies under each subsidy, as Part IV considers.
1.

Which Decisions Are Delegated?: Priorities, Monitoring, and
Timing

In both the deduction and the exclusion, the government delegates
three key choices to private decisionmakers. First, which charitable
missions and programs should the government subsidize? Since there
are over 1.5 million registered nonprofits in the United States, virtually every cause is represented, and nonprofits with similar missions
pursue them with different strategies and programs. As new social
problems arise, new organizations are launched to address them. Yet
instead of picking which organizations should benefit from the deduction and the exclusion, the government leaves this choice to private
individuals.
Second, these subsidies do not rely on the government to monitor
the quality of a charity's work. Government officials do not review
whether funded initiatives are succeeding, or whether the professional
staff is competent and motivated.
Third, government officials do not decide whether a charity should
spend money now or later. They do not determine whether a charity's
mission will become more important or easier to pursue effectively in
the future.

Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law

TAX LAW REVIEW

2.

[Vol. 71:

Which Private Parties Determine Priorities, Quality, and
Timing?

Since the government does not choose the cause, monitor quality,
or determine the timing of a charity's spending, who makes these
choices? With both the deduction and the exemption, four constituencies influence these choices: beneficiaries, donors, the board, and
the professional staff. This Subsection briefly surveys their roles,
describing the roles they actually play under current law, not the roles
they should play. The latter (and other normative issues) are considered in Parts III through VI.
a.

Beneficiaries

The first group is the charity's beneficiaries. They cover a larger
share of the budget in some charities than in others, and their influence grows as they fund more of the budget. For instance, symphonies and museums sell tickets, so their professional staffs choose
performances and exhibits that attract an audience. Fee-paying beneficiaries wield more influence not only because nonprofits depend on
their fees, but also because this "programmatic revenue" is likely to
induce more than one operating charity to serve them. In a competitive market, beneficiaries have a louder voice, as when universities
compete for students.
In addition to influencing priorities, beneficiaries often are wellpositioned to assess quality, since they participate in the charity's programs. Some charities are more active than others in seeking feedback from beneficiaries. Again, this feedback is more likely to be
influential when beneficiaries generate significant revenue for the
nonprofit.
Similarly, beneficiaries also can influence whether an operating
charity spends now or later. For example, in a competitive environment, paying beneficiaries may push a charity to focus on them, instead of on (as yet unidentified) future beneficiaries.
b.

Donors

The second group of private decisionmakers is donors. They choose
which causes and programs to support, and also can restrict the way
charities use contributions.
Yet although donors have significant sway over the way charities

spend money, their influence is not infinite. The limits in some gift
agreements are very general (for example, "to support science" or "to
help underprivileged children"), leaving nonprofit managers meaningful discretion.
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Since money is fungible, even tight restrictions matter only if they
induce a charity to increase its support for the targeted initiative. For
example, assume a donor requires a university to use her gift-which
represents 0.5% of the university's budget-to fund financial aid,
while other donors give unrestricted gifts. As long as the university
would otherwise commit at least 0.5% of its budget to financial aid,
this restriction has no effect; the gift merely funds what the university
would spend anyway.
Moreover, donors do not all want to influence charities in this way.
Some give unrestricted gifts, allowing managers to decide how to use
them. Others do not even choose a cause; by supporting umbrella
charities, such as the United Way or Jewish federations, they rely on
the charity's professionals (and in some cases committees of lay leaders) to allocate money to various operating charities.
Just as donors vary in how actively they direct their giving, they also
vary in their interest and ability to monitor quality. This role is more
feasible for large donors, since small donors-like small shareholders
in for-profit firms-have little influence (on their own) with management. To determine the quality of a charity's work, donors can rely on
32
media coverage and rating services (such as Charity Navigator).
They can favor charities that measure their own performance and
share these evaluations with donors. In addition, they can volunteer
time, as well as money, so they can form first-hand judgments about
the charity's impact and competence. Donors also can depend on professional advisors or intermediaries, such as managers of foundations
or of umbrella charities.
Three limits should be noted on a donor's ability and willingness to
monitor quality. First, quality is not always easy to define. For instance, although in theory donors could use contractual conditions to
require a stated level of quality, these conditions often would be hard
to specify and enforce. Second, experts who are supposed to monitor
quality, such as advisors or the managers of umbrella charities, may
have self-interested reasons not to do so. They are supposed to monitor the managers of operating charities, but who is monitoring them?
Third, donors themselves may also have self-interested motives in supporting charities (for example, networking, prestige, special access to
the charity's services, and the like). Even so, this sort of conflict
should not be overstated, since most donors presumably are trying to
advance a cause they value and want their gift to be used effectively.
Donors also influence whether operating charities should spend
money now or later. If donors want to support current work, they can
give "spendable" gifts, which the charity is free to spend currently or
32

Charity Navigator, http://www.charitynavigator.org (last visited June 7, 2018).
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to "bank" for later. Alternatively, if donors wish to support work in
the future, they can do so in two ways. First, they can create an endowment. To do so, donors enter into a contract with the charity (a
so-called "gift agreement"), which requires the charity to invest the
gift and allows the charity to spend only the income, not the principal.
Second, instead of turning the principal over to the charity, donors can
invest the money themselves. They can then use future income from
this investment to make spendable gifts to the charity every year.
c.

Board of Directors

A charity's board of directors also wields significant influence.
Since members of the board usually are donors, they have the various
levers described above.
In addition, they also can use the board's formal powers to influence how a charity spends money. The board sets broad policy goals,
reviewing budgets, and approving special expenditures and initiatives.
The board also chooses the CEO and can look for leaders with a particular vision.
Charitable boards usually also are self-perpetuating. In choosing
successors, they can look for candidates who share their priorities. A
caveat, though, is that the board is a group, and individuals on the
board may have competing views. The more divided they are, the less
influence the board is likely to have.
The board also is supposed to monitor quality, ensuring that the
organization has competent and motivated managers. A key lever is
the ability to replace the CEO (and thus to give guidance and feedback, which a CEO will take seriously). Boards also can require the
charity to implement systems that measure outcomes and can acquire
more information through personal involvement in the organization.
Yet boards (and individual board members) vary in their level of engagement. In addition, although they are supposed to monitor the
managers, there is always the question of who monitors them.
Boards also influence whether charities spend now or later. They
usually approve the nonprofit's budget. In addition, they also decide
how the endowment should be invested, as well as how much income
should be distributed. In addition, if a charity has an operating surplus, the board can decide to invest it, and can choose to spend this
surplus later.
d.

Managers

The fourth group of decisionmakers is the nonprofit's managers.
Their professional expertise usually commands some deference, while
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their day-to-day control of operations enables them to make any decisions that donors and the board have not made. As a practical matter,
they have residual authority.
Managers are centrally involved in deciding how charities spend
money. They choose and implement programs. When charities have
programmatic revenue (for example, from tuition, ticket sales, fees
from patients), managers allocate it. The same is true of unrestricted
donations, whether from spendable gifts or unrestricted endowments.
Although managers have somewhat less control over restricted donations, they still have some influence for two reasons. First, if a restriction is very general, managers have leeway in the way they spend
it; for example, a gift for financial aid can be used for needs-based aid,
merit-based aid, or loan repayment assistance. Second, even if the
restriction is more specific, the fungibility of money leaves a manager
unconstrained, as noted above, as long as the manager wants to spend
some money on the designated purpose and does not already have
enough restricted funds to cover what she wants to spend.
While managers are also supposed to ensure that the nonprofit's
work is of high quality, agency costs are a serious concern. An operating charity's success often is hard to measure, the staff controls key
information, and there are no owners to look over their shoulders.
Without meaningful monitoring, managers are free to define their
mission and workload in self-interested ways. Incompetence also becomes harder to detect. The staff also may be committed to a misguided or an out-of-date vision of how to help beneficiaries. Or they
may be overly risk-averse, putting their own reputations ahead of the
well-being of beneficiaries.
One mitigating factor, mentioned above, is competition. Beneficiaries have more influence-and thus can demand quality-if more
than one operating charity is competing to be their service provider.
Likewise, competition for philanthropic support can also motivate
managers to excel.
Another mitigating factor is that nonprofit managers usually are
committed to the cause, and thus may be less interested in taking personal advantage of their position.33 Yet even idealists sometimes add
less value (and are less competent) than they realize.
33 If beneficiaries cannot effectively measure quality, they may worry the organization is
taking advantage of them. Henry Hansmann has argued that the nonprofit form-and, in
particular, the inability to distribute profits-can build trust by eliminating a key incentive
to skimp on quality. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 Yale L.J.
835 (1980). Yet the nondistribution constraint is only a partial solution. Even though managers cannot distribute profits, they can access the surplus in other self-interested ways.
For instance, they can claim excessive pay, exert insufficient effort, or pursue pet projects.
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Managers play a central role in deciding not only what to fund, but
also when to do so. They control whether to spend or save programmatic revenue, as well as unrestricted gifts and endowment income
(although boards can weigh in on these issues as well). While managers do not have the ability to spend the principal of an endowment
gift, they may be able to borrow against its value.
e.

Indirect Government Influence

Even though the government delegates key choices to these groups
of private individuals, the government still exerts some influence. For
instance, when the government disagrees with the way charities are
allocating funds, it can threaten to intervene. In some cases, the
threat alone can change a charity's behavior. For example, Congress
more of
periodically has held hearings urging universities to spend
34
their endowment, and some have done so in response.
In addition, Congress can offset the choices of donors and managers, at least to an extent, when it allocates direct grants to charities.
For instance, if Congress believes that elite cultural organizations derive too much benefit from the deduction and exemption, it can reduce the grant-making budget of the National Endowment for the
Arts. This adjustment enables Congress to retain some control over
the overall level of government funding for cultural organizations (although Congress would still not dictate how much goes to each museum or symphony). Of course, the extent to which Congress uses this
lever to offset donor choices is an empirical question, which is not
considered here.
C.

How Do the Deduction and Exemption
Delegate These Decisions?

With both the deduction and the exemption, government officials
delegate choices about priorities, quality, and timing, and they rely on
the same group of private parties to do so. But how specifically do the
deduction and exemption provide funding without allocating it?
Both subsidies rely on very general criteria to determine eligibility.
For example, charities that qualify under § 501(c)(3) are eligible for
both subsidies. The standard is quite expansive, asking whether chari34 Michael Stratford, Billion Dollar Targets, Inside Higher Ed (Feb. 16, 2016), https://
www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/02/16/congress-returns-scrutiny-wealthy-university-endowments ("Grassley floated the idea of requiring universities to spend a certain amount
of their endowments each year. Although his plans were dropped, the scrutiny is widely
credited with spurring more generous, no-loan financial aid packages for low- and middleincome students at the wealthiest institutions.")
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ties are "organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes. '35
To confirm that they qualify, charities seek a letter from the IRS. In
their application, they share their bylaws and articles of incorporation,
and also describe their mission, projected budget, and sources of funding. Yet although the application process can be burdensome and
does not always yield a successful outcome, the government is not
supposed to assess the merits of the cause or the charity's competence
to advance it. Rather, as long as charities satisfy very general requirements, the deduction and exemption are automatically available when
private individuals take the relevant steps.
1.

The Charitable Deduction

For the deduction, the relevant step is a contribution to charity.
Since contributions reduce a donor's taxable income, and thus her tax
bill, the government is a silent partner in this contribution. Significant
dollars are at stake. In 2014, Americans gave $358.38 billion to charity.36 Donations represented 13.3% of the revenues of public charities.37 The deduction is expected to cost the federal government $63
billion in 2018.38
In committing these funds, government officials obviously do not
have discretion to adjust the size of the subsidy, regardless of what
they think of the cause, the quality of the management team, or the
timing of when the charity will pursue the relevant goals. Instead, the
subsidy rate is based on the donor's marginal tax rate.
2.

Tax Exemption for Income

For the exemption, by contrast, the subsidy is triggered when a
charity earns income. Since this revenue is not taxed, the subsidy is
the marginal rate that otherwise would apply to the charity (the 21%
corporate tax rate). Once again, government officials have no discretion to adjust the size of the subsidy, regardless of their view of the
particular charity.
Operating charities can earn three types of exempt income, and this
Article focuses only on the third. First, charities are not taxed on do35 IRC § 501(c)(3). In general, the deduction is available only for contributions to organizations that qualify under § 501(c)(3), but the exemption is somewhat more widely available. For example, some organizations can earn exempt income, even though
contributions to them are not deductible. This is the case for social welfare organizations
that engage in lobbying, labor unions, and trade associations. IRC § 501(c)(4), (5).
36 See McKeever, note 20, at 9.
37 Id. at 5.
38 See note 6.
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nations. Yet this treatment is consistent with the general rule39for gifts,
which spares recipients from tax, and thus is not a subsidy.
Second, charities pay no tax on revenue earned in pursuing their
mission. In 2013, operating revenue (such as tuition for universities
and fees to hospitals) represented 47.5% of U.S. public charities' receipts. 4° Yet even if the exemption is repealed, charities still would
not be taxed on operating revenue as long as they have enough deductions to shelter it. In other words, a charity is treated more favorably
a subsidy-only when
than for profit-firms-rendering the exclusion
41
its revenue funds nondeductible expenses.
A third source of exempt income, which is the focus of this Article,
is income from passive investments, such stocks, bonds, and commodities. (For simplicity's sake, this Article uses the phrase "investment
42
income" or "endowment income" to describe this passive income.) 43
In 2013, public charities earned $83 billion of investment income,
and private foundations made over $55 billion in grants, which can
44 If this estiserve as a rough estimate of the foundations' income.
mate is correct, exempting this investment income costs the federal

39 Halperin, note 9, at 285; Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d. 137, 143 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (IRS represented that church whose tax exemption was revoked for engaging in
political activities could still receive gifts tax-free).
40 McKeever, note 20, at 5 fig.2.
41 For example, excluding tuition revenue is a subsidy when it funds a new building
(which would be capitalized), but not faculty salaries (which would be deducted).
Halperin, note 9, at 285 ("if an expenditure would be deductible when made, tax exemption for amounts set aside for such expenditures does not reduce the present value of tax
payments even if these expenditures are deferred"); Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert,
The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Tax, 85 Yale L.J. 299,
311-12 (1976) ("[P]ermit[ting] nonprofit institutions to deduct all amounts expended to
advance their charitable ... objectives ... would achieve substantially the same result as
tax exemption, save for amounts earned in one year and either accumulated for future
expenditure or spent on buildings and equipment.").
42 An important exception is that investment income is taxable (as "unrelated business
taxable income") if a charity finances passive investments with debt or invests in an active
business. IRC § 511. For instance, if an art museum sells science books and city souvenirs
in its gift shop, this revenue is taxable. Rev. Rul. 73-105, 1973-1 C.B. 264.
43 The total revenue of public charities in 2013 was $1.73 trillion, see McKeever, note 20,
at 3 tbl.1, and 4.8% of this revenue-or $83 billion-came from investments, see id. at 5
fig.2.
44 Found. Ctr, Aggregate Fiscal Data of Foundations in the U.S., 2013, http:// http://data
3
(last visited Oct. 13,
.foundationcenter.org/#/foundations/all/nationwide/total/tist/201
2018).

Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law

2018]

CHARITABLE SUBSIDIES AND NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE

685

government approximately $48 billion,45 which is about as much as the
Treasury's estimate for the cost of the charitable deduction in 2013.46
A common rationale for the exemption is that a charity "stands in"
for its low-income beneficiaries, and thus should be taxed at the same
rate that applies to them. For instance, if a soup kitchen's clients pay
a zero rate, investment income earned on their behalf also should bear
this rate. 47 Yet this theory justifies an exemption-and treats it as a
product of progressive rates, instead of as a subsidy-only if beneficiaries are in the zero bracket. This is not necessarily the case for
many charities, including museums, symphonies, universities, environmental organizations, and churches.
For these charities, the exemption is a subsidy, since charities do not
pay tax on investment returns, but other taxpayers (generally) do. As
a result, the exemption creates an important inconsistency: If donors
keep an investment, their return (generally) is taxable. But if they
donate the investment to charity, the return is no longer taxed. 48
The value of the exemption to a charity depends on the size of its
endowment, 49 and charities vary markedly on this dimension. Although the charitable sector had $5.17 trillion of net assets in 2013,50
most charities have little or no endowment. Only 14% of charities
45 The 35% corporate rate in effect then would have generated $29 billion of tax on the
$83 billion of investment income of public charities. Since private foundations already pay
a 1% or 2% tax, an additional 34% would have yielded almost $19 billion of tax (assuming
their income was $55 billion). Applying the 21% rate corporate in effect in 2018 to these
2013 numbers, the revenue cost would be approximately $28 billion. These numbers would
be overstated if some of this investment income is taxed as unrelated business taxable
income (or is taxed to taxable "blocker" corporations that charities use to invest in active
businesses).
46 U.S. Treasury Dep't, Office of Tax Analysis, Tax Expenditures 251 (2017) (estimating
$48.87 billion), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Tax-Expend
itures-FY2013.pdf.
47 Bittker & Rahdert, note 41, at 315 (arguing that nonprofits should be taxed at the
personal rate of their beneficiaries, and defending use of zero as a rough estimate in order
to avoid "overtax[ing] the most needy beneficiaries").
48 Since a consumption tax differs from an income tax in not taxing investment returns,
another way to describe the exemption is that it applies a consumption tax to charities,
while retaining the income tax as the general rule.
49 Operating charities can accumulate investment assets in three ways. First, donors can
require the charity to invest their gift, allowing the charity to keep the principal and spend
only the income. Second, the charity itself can create the endowment, inviting donors to
contribute to it and committing to spend only the income. Third, a charity that earns more
than it spends can choose to invest this surplus. Technically, the term "endowment" refers
only to the first and second of these choices, and the third is usually called a "quasi-endowment." However, this Article uses the term "endowment" to describe all three (that is, a
portfolio of passive investments).
50 McKeever, note 20, at 3 tbl.1. Some of these assets presumably are not passive (such
as buildings that house the nonprofits). This total includes the assets of all reporting nonprofits, including public charities and private foundations.
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registered with the IRS in 2015 have $500,000 or more of assets.51
Half of private foundations have less than $500,000, and only 12%
have more than $5 million. 52 Among public charities, the largest 10%
53
hold 87% of the assets.
III.

DONATIONS AND INVESTIEBLE SURPLUS AS PROXIES
FOR SOCIAL VALUE

The last Part emphasized the government's limited role in the deduction and exemption. Government officials do not choose which
causes to support, monitor the effectiveness of management, or decide
whether charities should spend or save. Instead, the government relies on private decisionmakers. To do so, the government makes funding available automatically, as long as charities satisfy the relevant
criteria.
Since the government is not directly vetting the charity, the criteria
the charity has to satisfy should correlate, as much as possible, with a
cause's social value. In other words, the conditions a charity has to
meet should be easier for a charity with an important mission and a
strong track record of performance.
Notably, the deduction and the exemption use different criteria. To
benefit from the deduction, a charity has to attract donations. Government money flows only if donors value a charity enough to support
it themselves, and thus have "skin in the game." The deduction does
not help charities that receive no gifts and are funded solely with in54
come from operations or endowment.
In contrast, the exemption for investment returns has a different
precondition: Operating charities benefit only if they have money to
invest.55 Admittedly, this money could come from a donor-for instance, in the form of an endowment gift-but it does not have to do
so. Instead, the charity can fund the investment by running an operating surplus (for example, through extra operating revenue or stringent

51 Guidestar, Nine Things You Might Not Know About U.S. Nonprofits 4-5 (2015),
https://trust.guidestar.org/what-does-the-nonprofit-sector-really-look-like
52

Id.

53 Id. at 5.
54 The deduction may have helped the charity acquire the endowment, if it comes from a
gift instead of from operating surpluses, but the deduction does not affect the charity's
ability to live off the return from the endowment.
55 In theory, the charity can generate resources to invest by borrowing, but debt-financed investments are generally not able to earn tax-free returns; instead their returns
generally are taxed as unrelated business taxable income. See IRC § 514.
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cost-control). 56 This Part argues that attracting contributions is a better proxy for a charity's social value than having an investible surplus.
A.

Contributions as Evidence of Social Value

Giving charity means forgoing consumption, so donors have to prioritize the cause over marginal dollars for themselves. Donors also
have to prefer their cause to other charities. The range of options is
vast, including religious organizations, poverty and disaster relief, education, public policy, civil and human rights, the environment, cultural
organizations, and much more. For each cause, several organizations
usually compete for donations. Therefore, a charity has to make a
strong case.
In evaluating charities, donors have access to significant information, so it is feasible to make informed judgments. Organizations have
websites and printed materials, and also sponsor events to publicize
their activities. For sufficiently large gifts, a charity's managers spend
time with potential donors. In many cases, donors give time as well as
money, and this volunteer work educates them about the charity's
strengths and weaknesses. The media also covers nonprofits, and various websites evaluate their work. Donors also can get input from professional advisers, as noted above.
This is not to say that every charitable donation is based on rigorous
analysis, rich information, and deep insight. Coworkers, neighbors,
and family members ask each other to buy raffle tickets or cookies for
their causes. Some donors buy tickets to a charity's dinner because a
friend is being honored, not because they personally value the cause.
Some contributions are given to satisfy a social or professional obliga'57
tion, or to avoid the awkwardness of saying "no.
Even when donors take these decisions seriously, their choices will
not appeal to everyone. Donors have heterogeneous preferences, so
causes that resonate with some are unpersuasive-or even unappealing-to others. But charitable subsidies are supposed to support
causes outside the mainstream, as noted above. Admittedly, some donations-and, thus, some uses of government money-are misguided.
In some cases, nonprofit managers block poor choices by asking the
donor to support something else. If this effort fails, the manager may
56 See Halperin, note 9, at 300-01 (noting that exemption becomes relevant when revenue exceeds deductible costs).
57 Even casual gifts can be a positive signal in some cases. Donors may support their
friends' causes with the expectation that friends will reciprocate; if so, these gifts really are
indirect support for the donors' own causes. Donors may support a family member or
friend's cause because they respect her judgment. In any event, these uninformed choices
are more likely for small gifts. For larger gifts, donors are likely to invest more time and
thought.
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refuse the gift, for instance, if the charity would have to devote matching money, or if the manager worries that the initiative would undermine the charity's (and her personal) reputation.
Even if the nonprofit takes the gift-for instance, because the nonprofit manager also has flawed judgment-this problem is hardly
unique to charity. Unwise choices also occur in the for-profit sector,
skewing resource allocation and shrinking the tax base, since tax
losses are deductible. Likewise, unwise votes and campaign contributions distort government policy. It is not obvious why this problem is
worse in charities than anywhere else.
The bottom line, then, is that a charity's ability to raise money
should correlate, to an extent, with its social value. Although this correlation is by no means perfect, it should be meaningful. Since donors
have skin in the game, the government can be more comfortable piggybacking on their judgments.
B.

Investible Surplus: Less Reliable Evidence of Social Value

In contrast, a charity must satisfy different conditions to claim the
subsidy for investment returns: The charity needs a surplus to invest, 58 and the investment has to yield a positive return.
In some cases, an investible surplus is evidence of social value for an
operating charity. For example, if a surplus derives from increasing
revenue-whether from donations or from fees for the charity's services-it shows that donors and beneficiaries value the charity's work.
A caveat, though, is that an endowment donated long ago reveals
more about the charity's value in the past than today.
Surpluses can arise not only from increased revenue, but also from
reduced costs. Obviously, intelligent cost-cutting is a positive step.
But sometimes an operating charity cuts its expenditures for problematic reasons. For example, when the mission becomes less relevant,
there are fewer opportunities to spend money effectively. To make
matters worse, managers might hoard cash to protect their jobs, so the
payroll is still covered if disillusioned donors end their support.
Even when a surplus is evidence of social value, investing it successfully is not. After all, why would a charity's ability to choose the right
stocks and bonds correlate with the value of its mission? Earning robust investment returns is not as dependable a proxy for social value
as attracting donations. 59
58 See note 55.
59 While an endowment is not necessarily evidence of a charity's social value, it offers
another mechanism to pursue the organization's goals: the opportunity to choose investments that advance (or at least are consistent with) the charity's mission. For example, an
environmental organization may choose not to invest in polluting firms. Assuming this
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STALE ALLOCATIONS

AND AGENCY COSTS
Not only is the exemption triggered by less reliable evidence of social value, but it also has a second disadvantage: Unlike the charitable
deduction, it favors endowment gifts over spendable gifts. While endowments are appropriate in many circumstances, the choice to support an operating charity with an endowment, instead of spendable
gifts, turns on context-specific trade-offs. This Part argues that the tax
law should not favor one, as opposed to the other. The downside of
favoring endowments is that the charity, instead of the donor, controls
the assets. As a result, donors become less free to update judgments
about the cause or to monitor management. More generally, this tax
preference enhances the influence of nonprofit managers, and correspondingly erodes the influence of donors.
A.

Tax Preferencefor Endowments Instead of Spendable Gifts

Since charities do not pay tax on their investment returns, but donors generally do (except when they can take advantage of special
rules offering favorable treatment), the same investment earns a better after-tax return if owned by a charity. 60 As a result, to the extent
that donors are not able to avoid tax on their investment returns, they
have a tax incentive to transfer assets to charities. If they give the
assets to an operating charity, they lose control over them.
1.

An Illustrative Example

To see this effect, assume a donor is considering either (1) contributing an endowment to an operating charity, or (2) investing the
money herself and contributing the investment income to the charity
each year. Assume the donor and charity each earn a 7% pretax return on investments. Is one option more tax-efficient than the other?
First Scenario: Charity and Donor Are Taxed at the Same Rate
on Investments
First, assume that contributions are deductible and the same tax
rate applies to the donor and the charity, which is assumed to be the
a.

investment philosophy reduces its endowment return, the nonprofit should consider
whether this use of resources advances its mission more or less cost-effectively than
alternatives.
60 This effect is analogous to the familiar tax advantage of retaining earnings when a
corporation's tax rate is lower than the tax rate available outside the corporation, as well as
the tax advantage of a multinational corporation in keeping earnings in a low-tax foreign
subsidiary.
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top rate for individuals under current law (37%).61 On one hand, if
the donor contributes a $100,000 endowment, the charitable deduction reduces her after-tax cost to $63,000 (since she avoids $37,000 of
tax). The charity earns a 7% pretax return of $7000 per year. Since
the charity is assumed to pay tax on this endowment return, the charity pays a 37% tax of $2590, and has $4410 to spend each year.
On the other hand, the donor can invest the money herself. Since
she is no longer contributing $100,000 to charity, she has to pay
$37,000 in tax, and can invest only $63,000. At 7%, this investment
generates $4410 per year. Since the donor contributes this $4410 to
the charity, the charitable deduction shelters it from tax, allowing the
charity to spend the same $4410 each year. Therefore, a system that
offers only a charitable deduction-with no exemption for a charity's
investment income-does not favor endowment gifts over spendable
support.
b.

Second Scenario: Charity and Donor Are Not Taxed on
Investment

For the tax law to be even-handed between spendable and endowment gifts, the key is to tax donors and charities the same way on
investments. This condition is satisfied not only by taxing both at the
same rate, as illustrated above, but also by exempting both.
Assume the donor and the charity can both earn a tax-free return,
for instance, because the income tax is replaced by a cash flow consumption tax. 62 If the donor contributes a $100,000 endowment, the
charitable deduction allows her to contribute pretax dollars-that is,
the full $100,000, without having to pay a $37,000 tax. The charity
earns a 7% return of $7000 per year, but this return is now assumed to
be exempt, so the charity can spend $7000 each year.
Alternatively, instead of making an endowment gift of $100,000, the
donor can invest the money herself. Yet unlike in the prior example,
she can now invest pretax dollars. Under a cash flow consumption
tax, she can deduct the $100,000 she invests. This means she can invest the full $100,000, instead of only $63,000. Like the charity, then,
the donor can generate a 7% return of $7000 each year. Under a cash
flow consumption tax, this amount would ordinarily be taxed, if it is
not reinvested. But the donor can shelter this $7000 from tax by contributing it to charity. As a result, the charity has the same $7000 to
61 In 2018, the top rate for individuals generally is 37%, though the top rate for longterm capital gain generally is 20%, and investment income may be subject to an additional
3.8% tax.
62 A cash flow consumption tax functions like an unlimited deductible IRA. Taxpayers
deduct amounts they invest and are taxed when they spend this money.
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spend each year. 63 The bottom line, then, is that endowment gifts also
lose their advantage over spendable gifts if investment returns are exempt for both the charity and the donor.

c.

Third Scenario: Donor Is Taxed, But Charity Is Not

This neutrality is eliminated if a charity's investments are tax-exempt, but a donor's investments are taxed, as generally is the case
under current law. Since the charity has an edge in investing the
money, donors can support an operating charity more cost-effectively
by donating an endowment to the charity, instead of investing money
64
themselves and donating the return.
If the donor contributes an endowment of $100,000 (which, again, is
assumed to be deductible), the charity can earn 7% per year after tax,
and thus has $7000 to spend. In contrast, if the donor keeps this
$100,000, she can invest only $63,000 after paying a 37% tax. Assuming this investment yields the same 7%-but on a base of $63,000,
instead of $100,000-the donor earns $4410 each year. By making a
tax-deductible contribution of this $4410 to the charity, she avoids tax
on these investment earnings. Even so, the charity has only $4410 per
year to spend, instead of $7000. In other words, the charity has more
money to spend if the donor makes an endowment gift, instead of
65
keeping the principal and contributing the income each year.

63 Notably, this treatment can be replicated-or, at least, approximated-under current
law, as long as the donor's investment can earn a tax-free return. For instance, the donor
can fund charitable gifts with an IRA or with appreciated stock (although, with appreciated stock, the donor is "locked in" to the investment and cannot switch to another without
triggering tax). For a discussion, see Subsection JV.A.2.
64 Halperin, note 9, at 305 (because other future consumption by the donor is affected
by the income tax on investment earnings accumulated for this purpose, "when the charity
is exempt, the price reduction for charitable spending, as compared to other deferred consumption, is relatively greater the longer consumption is deferred").
65Notably, endowment gifts retain this advantage over spendable gifts even if the charitable deduction is repealed. Returning to the recurring example, if the donor wants to use
$100,000 of pretax income to contribute an endowment, she can contribute only $63,000 if
the contribution is no longer deductible. The charity earns a 7% return of $4410 each year
and can keep it all (since endowment returns are assumed to be exempt). In contrast, if
the donor invests this $63,000 herself, she earns a pretax return of $4410. But if charitable
contributions are not deductible, she has to pay a 37% tax on this income and has only
$2778 to contribute. So if the donor keeps the investment, the charity has 37% less to
spend each year ($2778, instead of $4410). In other words, the exemption favors endowment gifts over spendable gifts, regardless of whether contributions are deductible.
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Caveat: Access of Donors to Tax-Free Investments on Their
Own

In concluding that the exemption favors endowments over spendable gifts, the analysis so far has assumed that donors are taxed on
their investment returns. In contrast, if donors had the same ability as
charities to earn tax-free returns, there would no longer be a tax advantage in shifting assets to charity. Although donors usually are
taxed on investment returns, there are three ways they can replicate
the tax-free return of operating charities, at least to an extent, while
keeping the assets, or at least maintaining some control over them.
First, donors can invest in growth stocks. After all, when donors
contribute appreciated shares to charity, they never pay tax on the
appreciation. 66 Even so, some of a charity's tax advantages as an investor are still beyond a donor's reach: Unlike a charity, donors have
to pay tax on dividends, and also are taxed if they sell appreciated
67
assets to rebalance their portfolios.

Second, instead of donating an endowment to an operating charity,
a donor can give it to a private foundation. While this is still an endowment gift to a charity, the donor retains significant control over
the endowment. Every year, the donor is free to allocate endowment
income to whatever charities she chooses, as if she still owned these
investments, but the tax on this income is much lower than if the donor still owned them.
Even so, these advantages come at a cost. Holding the endowment
in a private foundation, instead of giving it to an operating charity,
adds a layer of administrative costs, including recordkeeping and filing
obligations. If the donor does not make allocation decisions herself,
she also incurs direct costs in hiring someone else, as well as agency
costs if the foundation manager is incompetent, self-interested, or has
different preferences.
In addition, endowment gifts to private foundations are not taxed as
favorably as endowment gifts to public charities. Both the exemption
and the deduction are less generous for private foundations than for
public charities. A private foundation's investment income is not
completely exempt; instead, its investment income is subject to a modest tax (of 1% or 2%) as long as the foundation spends enough of it
each year. 6s This tax becomes much higher, moreover, if the founda66 The corporation still has to pay tax at the corporate level, but this is true when taxexempts own shares as well.
67 Donors also can invest tax-free in IRAs, 401(k)s, 529 plans, and other special vehicles,
but these vehicles are subject to various limitations. IRC §§ 401(k), 529.
68 IRC § 4940(e). (The tax is reduced from 2% to 1% if the foundation makes a minimum distribution and satisfies other requirements).
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tion does not distribute enough income. 69 There are also draconian
penalties for self-dealing, 70 funding impermissible purposes (such as
political activity, nonqualifying travel or study grants for individuals), 71 having a controlling position in a private business, 72 and violat73
ing other restrictions as well.
In addition, deductions are more limited when donors contribute to
private foundations, instead of public charities. 74 For instance, when
donors contribute appreciated property to charity, they would like to
deduct the property's fair market value, instead of its basis. This
favorable treatment is more widely available for donors who support
public charities, instead of private foundations. 7 5 In addition, when
donors contribute a large percentage of their income to charity, they
can deduct more of it when contributing to public charities, instead of
private foundations. For example, for cash contributions, donors generally can deduct up to 50% of their adjusted gross income when contributing to public charities, but only 30% when contributing to
76
private foundations.
Third, instead of donating assets to a private foundation, a donor
can contribute them instead to a donor-advised fund. Since these
funds are structured to qualify as public charities, they avoid the extra
tax and administrative costs described above. But unlike with a gift to
69 IRC § 4942 (an initial tax of 30%, and a subsequent tax of 100% if the foundation
does not correct the problem by making a sufficient distribution).
70 IRC § 4941.
71 IRC § 4945.
72 IRC § 4943 (an initial tax of 10% and a subsequent tax of 200% if the foundation
does not divest itself of the excess business holdings).
73 To avoid these limits on private foundations, taxpayers can use a grant-making vehicle
that qualifies as a social welfare organization under § 501(c)(4). Like private foundations,
social welfare organizations are not taxed on income and, if they receive a contribution of
appreciated assets, built-in gain is never taxed. Yet there is a downside to using a social
welfare organization, instead of a private foundation: Contributions to this entity are not
deductible. So compared with a private foundation, a social welfare organization offers a
better exemption, but no deduction. See generally David S. Miller, Advice for Jeff Bezos:
Social Welfare Organizations as Grantmakers, NYU J. Leg. & Pub. Pol'y (forthcoming),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3198759.
74 See Wealth of Knowledge-Spring 2012-A Primer on Private Foundations (Apr. 15,
2012), http://www.eisneramper.com/private-foundation-0412/ ("Although a private foundation does provide the donor with maximum control over the entity's eventual charitable
distributions, the trade-off is that the charitable income tax deduction for contributions to
a private foundation is far less generous than for contributions to a public charity; in addition, stringent rules must be observed to make sure that the foundation-and its foundercomply with the law.").
75 IRC § 170(e)(1)(B)(ii) (disallowing deduction of built-in gain for contributions to certain private foundations).
76 See IRC § 170(b)(1)(A), (B). The limits on contributions of appreciated stock, moreover, generally are 30% for public charities and 20% for private foundations. IRC
§ 170(b)(1)(C), (D). Notably, contributions to certain types of private foundations (such
as "operating" foundations) are treated more generously. IRC § 170(b)(1)(F).
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an operating charity, the donor retains some control, helping to
choose which charities receive the income every year. Donors pay a
fee for this privilege (of approximately .6% per year). 77 Another
downside of donor-advised funds is that, in theory, the donor's role is
limited to giving advice, so donors have less control than in private
foundations. But as a practical matter, donor-advised funds generally
follow this advice, even though they are not obligated to do so.
The bottom line, then, is that donors can replicate at least some of

the tax advantages of endowment gifts without committing their assets
to a particular operating charity. But there still are costs in doing so,
including fees, administrative costs, extra tax costs, and legal uncertainty (for example, about how much control a donor can exert in a
donor advised fund).
B.

Governance Problems with the Tax Bias for Endowments

As a result, the cheapest and most straightforward way to support
an operating charity with tax-free returns is to give it an endowment
gift, allowing the charity to control the assets. Yet this tax advantage
of endowment gifts over spendable gifts can distort behavior, exacerbating governance problems at nonprofits.
To be clear, the point is not that endowments are always undesirable. On the contrary, they offer familiar advantages, assuring a program's permanence, enabling operating charities to undertake longterm projects, easing fundraising burdens on the staff, signaling confidence in a way that may attract other donors, and allowing donors to
support a charity beyond their lifetimes. To an extent, though, multiyear commitments of spendable gifts can replicate these advantages,
while allowing donors more flexibility.
Since the right balance between spendable and endowment gifts is a
subtle question, involving a number of context-specific trade-offs, it is
hard to see why the tax law should put a thumb on the scale. As this
Section shows, the tax bias for endowments under current law can
have two unfortunate effects: It can erode the motivation and ability
of charities to change with the times, and also can impede the ability
of donors to monitor the performance of managers.
1.

Stale Allocations

Operating charities that live off endowments may become complacent, addressing dated problems with stale solutions. In contrast, op77 John R. Brooks, The Missing Tax Benefit of Donor-Advised Funds, 150 Tax Notes
1013-24, 1014 (Feb. 29, 2016).
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erating charities that depend on spendable donations and operating
income are forced to remain relevant. Like start-ups that depend on
"staged financing" from venture capitalists, 78 these charities are constantly being evaluated, and must keep proving themselves.
Admittedly, a charity that receives an endowment gift must have
impressed the donor who gave it. But the donors who gave this
money are not offering a current judgment. In some cases, these donors-and the managers who secured their support-passed away decades ago. While endowments are permanent, a charity's value can
change. Yet once donors have given an endowment to an operating
charity, they can no longer re-evaluate it and redirect their support.
In addition to undercutting an operating charity's motivation to
change, endowments can undercut its ability to do so by limiting the
way it can spend money. This issue obviously does not arise with a socalled "unrestricted" endowment, but it can be important when donors enter into a contract with the charity to specify how the money
will (or will not) be used. Restrictions can become outdated as the
cause becomes less relevant, or the right strategies for advancing it
change. Admittedly, spendable gifts can also be restricted, but these
limits are imposed currently, and thus are less likely to become stale.
Donors can tailor them to current circumstances and can change them
later. These steps are less feasible for endowments-and sometimes
are impossible-especially when the relevant donors have passed
away.
2.

ManagerialAgency Costs

Charitable subsidies should flow not only to the right causes, but
also to the right organizations, favoring those that run efficiently. Yet
just as government officials do not choose which causes to fund, they
also do not monitor the performance of nonprofit managers. Instead,
this responsibility is delegated to a charity's donors and board of
directors.
Yet endowments can undercut this monitoring by insulating managers from the need to produce results. Admittedly, donors evaluate
managers before giving an endowment gift. But this due diligence is
conducted ex ante, as emphasized above. 79 Once donors have given
an endowment gift to an operating charity, they forgo the right to reevaluate the charity over time. Of course, donors can still retain some
influence by giving an endowment over time, and thus motivating
78 Gilson & Schizer, note 11.

79 Testamentary gifts-and, thus, the charitable deduction in the estate tax--also frontload monitoring in this way.
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managers to impress them in order to receive future payments. But as
donors approach the completion of their giving, their leverage wanes.
They may still wield influence in other ways, such as by serving on the
nonprofit's board, but they lose the ability to redirect their giving.
In contrast, if donors invest the assets themselves and donate the
return each year, they can withhold support if managers underperform. Just as the need for spendable gifts pressures managers
to change with the times, as noted above, it also motivates them to run
organizations more efficiently and to take less for themselves. For example, Brian Galle and David Walker have found that university presidents earn less "at institutions that are more highly dependent on
current donations as a source of revenue (versus tuition, grants,
etc.). ' 80 This may seem counterintuitive, since the president presumably should be rewarded for effective fundraising. But Galle and
Walker believe this finding shows that spendable donations constrain
agency costs. 8 1
Donors have to balance these governance advantages of annual
spendable gifts against the tax cost of keeping the assets themselves.
Of course, there are intermediate solutions as well. As noted above,
donors can give the endowment to a private foundation, instead of an
operating charity.8 2 This choice involves higher tax and administrative
costs than an endowment gift to an operating charity, but offers the
donor more control, as long as the donor runs the foundation
83
herself.
Yet the analysis is somewhat different when the foundation is run
by a professional manager. This manager is supposed to monitor the
operating charities who receive grants from the foundation, but who is
monitoring her? After all, a foundation manager might define her responsibilities and compensation in self-interested ways. In addition,
she might substitute her own preferences for the donor's, especially
after the donor's death. It is commonly observed, for instance, that
the grants and missions of prominent foundations no longer reflect the
preferences of their founders. 8 4 Therefore, private foundations can
80 Brian Galle & David I. Walker, Nonprofit Executive Pay as an Agency Problem: Evidence from U.S. Colleges and Universities, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 1881, 1887 (2014).
81 Id. ("The fact that more powerful donors are able to drive down pay levels implies
that presidents at schools with less-influential donors are extracting more pay than donors
would want.")
82 See Subsection IV.A.2.
83 Alternatively, the donor can give to a donor-advised fund. This option involves fewer
tax and administrative costs than the foundation, but (at least in theory) offers the donor
less control, as noted above.
84 For example, when Henry Ford II resigned from the board of the Ford Foundation,
which his grandfather created, he wrote: "[Tihe foundation is a creature of capitalism....
It is hard to discern recognition of this fact in anything the foundation does." See Fred
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mitigate some agency costs, while exacerbating others, depending on
the context.
In any event, even though funding charities with spendable gifts has
advantages, it has costs as well. Managers are likely to spend more
time raising money, leaving less time for other responsibilities. Moreover, when managers are more informed than donors, and thus make
better judgments, donor influence can lead to inferior decisions (if
managers are unable to persuade donors when they disagree). Donors can only serve as effective monitors during their lifetimes, and
generally cannot do so through testamentary gifts (unless they arrange
for an agent, such as a foundation manager, to do so).
Obviously, not all forms of donor influence are constructive. For
instance, donors sometimes seek to help themselves, instead of the
cause. In these cases, donors are a source of agency costs, instead of a
constraint on them. In response, charitable subsidies have familiar
rules to police donor self-interest, such as the "private benefit" doc85
trine. Although not a complete solution, these limits are helpful.
Given these trade-offs, the right balance is likely to vary with the
context. But again, it is not clear why the tax law should favor endowment gifts over spendable gifts. Since spendable gifts are preferable at
least some of the time, current law's tilt toward endowments is
problematic.
3.

The Relative Influence of Managers and Donors

In addition to these specific effects, the tax law's tilt toward endowments has a more general implication: It enhances the influence of
nonprofit managers, and correspondingly diminishes the influence of
donors.
After all, if a donor keeps an investment, and uses the income it
generates to fund annual spendable gifts, she retains control over
these resources. The donor can use this authority to set expectations
for the charity. If she believes these expectations have not been met,
she can redirect the income to a different charity.
In contrast, once a donor turns assets over to an operating charity,
she surrenders control of them to the charity's professional managers.
Admittedly, managers still have to abide by any restrictions that the
donor has imposed on the endowment, but they have some discretion
Smith, Rolling Over in the Grave, The Gathering, May 22, 2014, https://thegathering.com/
rolling-over/ (quoting Henry Ford II).
85 The dynamic here is like the one associated with large shareholders of private firms,
who can discipline management but also may seek private benefits of control. See Zohar
Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 Yale L.J. 560
(2016).

Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law

698

TAX LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:

in doing so. More fundamentally, they no longer are under as much
pressure to accommodate donor preferences.
This is relevant because donors and managers sometimes compete
for influence. As explained above, they may have different preferences about programmatic priorities and the timing of the charity's
spending. 86 In addition, donors and managers monitor each other to
deter self-interested behavior.
There is a parallel dynamic among grant-making charities. A donor
who makes a gift to a private foundation, and hires a manager to manage the foundation's work, has to monitor the manager. Depending
on the context, the donor probably has more direct ways to control
the manager, who effectively is the donor's employee. But if the donor does not remain personally involved in the foundation, the manager may prioritize her own preferences over those of the donor.
To sum up, subsidies can alter the balance of power among key
decisionmakers: The exemption for endowment income strengthens
the hand of professional managers in ways that the charitable deduction does not.
Caveat: Addressing Governance Issues in Other Ways

4.

This Part has identified governance costs of the exemption. Changing the tax law is one way to address this issue, but it is not the only
way. Changes in nonprofit law, the governing documents of nonprofits, and gift agreements could give other players more authority and
motivation to police these issues, including nonprofit boards, the state
attorney general, the IRS, courts, and others. Some of these adjustments could preserve the overall approach described here-in which
private individuals play the leading role in these choices-while others
would involve government institutions to a greater extent. Nevertheless, since this Article focuses on the tax law, an exploration of other
options is beyond this Article's scope.
V.

TIMING OF CHARITABLE ACTIVITIES

The last Part showed that governance problems arise when a donor
is taxed on investment returns, but a charity is not. This differential
encourages donors to give endowment gifts, instead of spendable gifts.
Yet once operating charities gain control of assets, donors cannot redirect them, and thus cannot monitor management as effectively or reevaluate the cause when conditions change. Likewise, donors who
give to private foundations and donor-advised funds face added costs,
86

See Subsection II.B.2.
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as well as the potential for agency costs involving the managers of
these grant-making vehicles.
Although the exemption imposes these governance costs, it offers
an offsetting advantage, which is considered in this Part: When charities decide whether to spend on current initiatives or save for future
ones, the tax law does not distort this choice. Although other commentators favor a bias toward current spending, 87 an even-handed
posture has three advantages, which are analyzed in turn. First, charities sometimes have good reasons to save. Second, nonprofit managers may have a bias toward current spending, which the tax law should
not reinforce. (Notably, other commentators attribute the opposite
bias to managers. 88) Third, taxing a charity's endowment, but not its
operations, would distort its investment choices.
Ultimately, these advantages have to be balanced against the governance issues discussed above. In my view, these advantages are not
sufficient to outweigh the governance problems. Nevertheless, this
Part shows why repealing or scaling back the exemption is not a costfree choice.
A.

Incentive of Charities to Save

While prior Parts have focused on how the exemption affects the
time preferences of donors-favoring endowment gifts over spendable gifts, as noted above-the exemption also influences the time
preferences of charities.
Like any taxpayer, a charity's motivation to save is affected by a tax
on investment returns. There is both an income and a substitution
effect, which cut in opposite directions. On one hand, if charities have
to accumulate a particular amount-for instance, to buy a buildingthey have to save more to reach this target. On the other hand, since
a tax on endowment returns increases the cost of saving-but not the
cost of spending now-it favors current activities over future ones.
Exempting endowment returns from tax eliminates these distortions.8 9
Do we want the tax law to influence whether charities spend or
save? If a charity's current activities are inherently more valuable
than its future ones, this would be a reason to discourage saving, and
87 Galle, note 9, at 1159 ("future charitable spending is likely to be less valuable because
the growing philanthropic sector will have to turn to lower priority projects"); Halperin,
note 19, at 20 ("Because the trade-off between current and future spending is obviously
both complex and fact-specific, it is perhaps best left to the organization to determine.
However, as explained next, there are factors that suggest that endowments may exceed
optimal amounts.").
88 See note 19.
89 Halperin, note 9, at 309 ("an exemption for investment income may be necessary to
make the charity neutral ... as between current and future spending.").
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thus to tax endowment returns. But if charities sometimes have good
reasons to save, a tax bias discouraging this choice is potentially costly.
This Section canvasses four justifications for charities to save.
1.

Future Cash Flow Will Be Volatile

First, a charity's future revenue can be volatile. For instance, operating revenue and donations usually decline in economic downturns.
This is especially problematic if, at the same time, the charity's mission
becomes more important, as when a soup kitchen has more people to
feed during a recession. To plan for this contingency, the soup kitchen
should set money aside.,
Yet a familiar challenge in relying on savings is that endowments
tend to decline when they are needed the most. As Halperin has emphasized, universities faced this challenge in 2008, when spendable do90
nations and endowment values plummeted at the same time. Even
so, the answer is not to write off saving as a solution, but to save more
intelligently. For instance, one option is to reduce the riskiness of the
charity's portfolio. Another is to spend less endowment income in
good times, and to spend correspondingly more income (and even
principal) in bad times.
2.

Future CharitableInitiatives Will Be More Effective

Charities also should save if their work will be more effective in the
future. They may need to wait for better technology. For instance,
significant money has been raised to treat ALS ("Lou Gehrig's Disease"). At the moment, only one drug has been approved by the
FDA, which is expensive but not very effective. 9 1 Instead of distributing this drug, a charity arguably should fund research, while maintaining a reserve to distribute a better drug, once it is developed.
In some cases, moreover, immediate action is less effective than a
multi-year effort. For instance, assume an elementary school receives
funding to offer a one-semester course to all its students, but the subject requires a minimum level of maturity, such as genocide studies or
sex education. Obviously, one option is to give the course now to all
students, regardless of their age. But if younger students will benefit
90 Halperin, note 19, at 25 (2011) ("a larger endowment in relation to the level of spending surprisingly made the institution more vulnerable").
91 S. Zoccolella, E. Beghi, G. Palagano, A. Fraddosio, V. Guerra, V. Samarelli, V. Lepore, I.L. Simone, P. Lamberti, L. Serlenga, G. Logroscino, Riluzole and Amyotrophic
Lateral Sclerosis Survival: A Population-Based Study in Southern Italy, 14 Eur. J. Neurol.
262 (2007) (noting that Riluzole is only treatment for ALS but its efficacy is unclear).
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more from the course when they are older, the school should set
money aside to offer it to them later.
Of course, this trade-off between present and future activities is less
stark if current work makes future efforts easier or more successful.
For example, curtailing carbon emissions now can ease climate costs
later. Yet although these "prepayment" discounts can be important,
they are not universal. For instance, how does providing hospice care
or meals in soup kitchens today help terminally ill or poor people in
the future? Some commentators suggest that charities always learn
from experience, so their work today inherently leads to better results
in the future.92 Yet this seems overly optimistic. In any event, charities are aware of these benefits of learning. They should not need a
tax preference to account for them.
3.

Future Harms Will Be More Serious

Saving is appealing not only if a charity's future work will be more
effective, but also if it will be more necessary. This is especially true
when the demand for a charity's services correlates with
macroeconomic cycles, as with a soup kitchen.
The other side of the coin is that charities should save less if they
expect fundraising to become easier or social problems to become less
severe. Because some commentators believe economic growth and
technological advances will make future generations better off, they
would repeal the exemption in order to favor current charitable activi93
ties over future ones.
Yet although social conditions might well improve, there is no guarantee. The last two centuries are an encouraging precedent, but
growth rates have been zero or negative for much of human history.9 4
A number of looming challenges, such as climate change, nuclear
proliferation, and exploding fiscal deficits, could make the future
more challenging than the recent past. Given this uncertainty, charities are likely to make somewhat different predictions about the future, and to adjust them over time. In my view, it is not obvious why a
tax thumb on the scale would improve these choices.
92 Galle, note 9, at 1160 ("Foundation advocates claim repeatedly that foundations are
almost unique in society in their power to use their grant-making ability to experiment,
measure outcomes, and derive lessons for the future. If so, though, delays in grant-making
also deny the world the opportunity to benefit from those lessons.").
93See, e.g., id. ("future generations could be wealthier than ours, on average. That implies that, if anything, we should borrow money from the future and spend it today.").

94 Panagiotis Limnios, When Did Medieval Europe's Economy and Standard of Living
Catch Up with What It Was During the Roman Empire?, Quora (Aug. 21, 2013), https://

www.quora.comlWhen-did-Medieval-Europes-economy-and-standard-of-iving-catch-upwith-what-it-was-during-the-Roman-Empire.
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FinancialInvestment Today Finances More CharitableSpending
Tomorrow

Another reason to save is that, if charities earn a positive return,
they can spend more tomorrow than they could today. But this argument proves too much. It suggests a charity should never spend, since
95
In principle, this
saving will always allow it to spend more later.
argument applies equally to individuals, but we do not consider their
current consumption to be inherently inferior to future consumption.
In both contexts, the flaw in this argument is that spending generates
96
current benefits, which are deferred when spending is delayed.
By saving, charities give up a social return (the benefits of current
spending) to earn a financial return (income on the endowment).
These returns should be compared. 97 Saving is better if the financial
return exceeds the social return, but spending is better if the opposite
is true. This analysis simply brings us back to the issues discussed
above, including whether future spending will be more effective or
more urgently needed.

B.

Biases of Self-Interested Managers

To sum up, the last Section rejected one rationale for taxing endowment returns: The idea that current activities are inherently more
worthwhile than future ones. This Section considers a different rationale, which Halperin has offered: If nonprofit managers are biased in
favor of future activities, the tax law should counter this bias by favoring current ones. 9s While this Section considers reasons why self-interested managers might favor future spending, as Halperin suggests,
the opposite bias is also plausible: Self-interested managers may pre-

fer to spend while they run the nonprofit, instead of conserving resources for successors.

95 Michael Klausner, When Time Isn't Money: Foundation Payouts and the Time Value
of Money, 41 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 421 (2003); Halperin, note 19, at 20 ("There would
always be more resources tomorrow. Obviously, this makes no sense.").
96 Halperin, note 19, at 21 ("In some cases, current spending can have a future benefit
greater than the return on a financial investment").
97 Galle, note 9, at 1158 ("foundations' decisions to restrict their spending should be
measured against the lost opportunities this decision presents. Doing otherwise would
cheat future generations as much as it would cheat present-day taxpayers.")
98 Halperin, note 9, at 280 ("it is likely that trustees, donors, and key employees have a
bias in favor of accumulating funds, as opposed to current spending, which does not necessarily reflect the interest of the institution, let alone the public").
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Appeal of Endowments to Managers and Other Key Constituents

Since this Section focuses on agency costs, the question is whether
endowments or spendable gifts are more likely to advance managers'
personal interests. Endowments offer four advantages. First, they can
enhance job security by giving managers permanent funding for their
salaries.
Second, endowments shield managers from pressure to accommodate donors and allow them to spend less time raising money. Compared with spendable gifts, endowments give donors less ability to
monitor management, as emphasized above. While weaker monitoring is bad for society, it obviously is appealing to self-interested
managers.
Third, managers can use endowment restrictions to constrain successors. A leader of a nonprofit who especially values a particular
initiative can ask donors to support it with restricted endowments.
The restrictions will prevent a successor with different priorities from
redirecting this money, assuring at least some permanent funding for
the initiative.
Finally, managers (and the nonprofit's board) may regard the endowment's size as a measure of their effectiveness. To enhance their
reputations, they may channel money into endowment, even if spendable gifts would otherwise be better. 99
2.

Appeal of Spendable Money to Managers and Other Key
Constituents

On the other side of the ledger, a self-interested manager has an
important reason to prefer spendable gifts: In the near-term, these
gifts expand the budget much more than endowment gifts. Admittedly, a $1 million endowment gift has the same present value as a $1
million spendable gift, as long as the endowment is invested at a market rate. Yet the spendable gift allows a manager to spend $1 million
right away. In contrast, a $1 million endowment gift increases the
budget by only $50,000 each year, assuming a 5% distribution rule.
Therefore, the spendable gift permits twenty times as much spending
in the first year. Even if the manager remains in office for ten years,
and thus can spend endowment income for ten years, the gap still is
wide. 100
99 Galle, note 9, at 1163 ("Studies report that foundation managers are often motivated
in significant part by the amount of the assets under their control, rather than by what
those assets can accomplish-a classic example of 'empire building."')
100 Spending $50,000 per year for ten years consumes $500,000. Since $450,000 of this
money is spent after the first year, the present value is lower, making the gap even wider.
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This timing difference matters because self-interested managers
may well prefer to spend money on their watch, instead of leaving it
for successors. A manager may expect her personal reputation to be
enhanced more by her own initiatives than by her successors' accomplishments. In addition, a manager also does not know if her successors will share her priorities; as a result, she may worry that money she
leaves for them could fund initiatives she does not favor. Spendable
gifts also can enable a manager to avoid trade-offs between competing
priorities, work less hard, earn higher pay, and be more generous with
colleagues.
This is not to say that self-interested managers always want to spend
everything now. One constraint is that they do not want to be
remembered as spendthrifts who burdened their successors with unsound finances. Even so, self-interested managers may discount this
reputational cost, if only because it is deferred until they retire or
leave for another job, and thus has less impact on them. This sort of
discounting is familiar in other settings. For example, some Wall
Street traders inflate their bonuses with questionable transactions,
knowing the reputational costs will not arise until after they leave.
Likewise, political leaders often prefer lower taxes and more spending
now, funded with higher taxes and less spending after they leave
office.
Of course, even if self-interested managers are not worried about
their future reputations, they still have other reasons to prefer endowment in some cases, as noted above. They also may not know exactly
how long their tenure will be. If their term ends unexpectedly, they
may leave a larger surplus for their successor than they intended. 101
Managers also would certainly rather work at an organization that already has a large endowment. Their life is easier in many ways, as
noted above. But even though managers are always happy to inherit a
large endowment from predecessors, they have less reason to build
the endowment themselves.
At the same time, other stakeholders could have different biases.
For instance, the board is responsible for the long-term viability of a
nonprofit. Through spending rules, scrutiny of budgets, and other
forms of oversight, they are supposed to reign in managers who focus
excessively on the near term. While this is an important role, trustees
may have self-interested reasons to pursue it too zealously, since they
worry about reputational costs of failing at this mission. Agency costs,
then, can cause trustees to favor the future over the present.
Donors also influence the timing of gifts, and their self-interest can
point in different directions. On one hand, spendable gifts enhance
101 In a sense, this is analogous to bequests motivated by "precautionary saving."
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their continuing influence, as noted above, and also offer immediate
impact. On the other hand, endowment gifts are permanent, and thus
offer more lasting impact and recognition. Heterogeneous donors are
likely to weigh these effects differently, so it is hard to generalize
about whether donor self-interest favors current spending or
endowment.
Given these competing dynamics, there is no universal answer to
the question of whether self-interested managers prefer endowments
or spendable gifts. Depending on the context, they could have reason
to favor one or the other. Therefore, although some commentators
believe there is an agency cost bias for endowments 0 2-and would
repeal the exemption as a response-this claim is unsatisfying. At
least some of the time, agency costs can push managers to spend now,
instead of saving. In these circumstances, taxing endowment returns
reinforces this bias, instead of countering it.
C.

Distorted Investment Choices

So far, this Part has analyzed two potential advantages of exempting
endowment returns: First a charity's choices about whether to spend
or save are not distorted; and second, the biases of self-interested
managers to spend on their watch are not reinforced. A third is that a
charity's choices about how to invest capital are not distorted.
1.

Investment Distortions

If operating charities were taxed on investment income, they would
begin making tax-motivated investment choices, just as taxable investors do. For example, charities would be "locked in" to appreciated
assets. If they were taxed on investment income, but not operating
income, they would game this distinction. For instance, by prepaying
expenses, they would earn a return that is economically equivalent 10to3
interest income, but is classified as tax-free income from operations.
For similar reasons, charities would prefer to invest in assets used in
their mission (which generate tax-free income), instead of passive investments (which would not). For instance, a charity that receives a
$10 million donation would be better off acquiring a building to house
its operations, instead of an endowment to fund future expenses. No102 See, e.g., Halperin, note 18, at 125; Galle, note 9, at 1159.
103For example, a nonprofit might receive a discount for prepaying rent. Instead of
paying $105,000 of rent next year, they might be able to pay only $100,000 now. This
$5,000 discount is akin to interest. Yet absent a special rule, this discount would inflate
their (tax-free) operating income. As a result, the charity would not pay tax on this "disguised" interest, even if it has to pay tax on its endowment income.
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tably, the charitable deduction (on its own) does not favor one of
these choices over the other. After all, donors receive the same deduction, whether their gift finances a building or a portfolio.
At first blush, the preference for business assets might seem justi14

fied in encouraging charities to use capital to pursue their mission. 0

But the resulting inconsistencies are hard to justify. For instance, why
should a charity that owns office space pay less tax than one that uses
endowment income to rent space? Likewise, should a school that invests capital in laboratory equipment have a tax advantage over one
that uses endowment income to fund faculty salaries?
2.

Fixing Investment Distortions: Should Nonprofits Be a Priority?

While a tax on endowment returns can distort investment choices,
this is true of any tax on investments. One way to eliminate these
distortions is to stop taxing investment returns across the board. Notably, this step would eliminate the governance concerns discussed
above: If donors also can earn tax-free returns, there no longer is a
tax reason to contribute an endowment. Donors can invest on their
own, donating the return, and thus can redirect giving if the charity
underperforms.
But if we fix investment distortions for only a subset of taxpayers, it
is not clear why operating charities should be singled out for this privilege. If the goal is to promote more efficient capital allocation, they
are not an obvious place to start, since their institutional missions
have little to do with investing. Effective investors are more likely to
work at hedge funds and investment banks than at museums and soup
kitchens. Admittedly, some operating charities are extremely sophisticated investors (such as university endowments), but they are outliers. Indeed, they possess this expertise in part because of the tax
preference for endowment gifts, which has helped them to accumulate
endowments that are large enough to justify hiring a team of in-house
managers. Setting these outliers aside, most operating charities have
no special skill at investing, so empowering them-instead of other
taxpayers-to make distortion-free investments is not an obvious way
to promote better capital allocation.
104 For example, Halperin notes that active investments are especially worthy of a subsidy, since they cannot be funded with the equity capital that would be available to forprofit firms. Halperin, note 9, at 285 ("the exemption for [income from related goods and
services] is special only when it is used for capital expenditures, which suggests a very
direct correlation between Hansmann's justification for the exemption and its actual impact"); Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from
Corporate Income Taxation, 91 Yale L.J. 54, 72 (1981) (arguing that tax exemption is compensation for capital constraints).
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Loss

To sum up, this Article has highlighted three problems with subsidizing endowment returns, which do not arise in subsidizing donations. First, investible surpluses are less reliable evidence of a
charity's social value than donations. Second, by encouraging donors
to front-load their giving to operating charities, subsidies for investment income complicate donors' ability to update philanthropic
choices and monitor management; likewise, donors who give endowments to private foundations and donor-advised funds can face parallel issues, including agency costs, administrative costs, and extra tax
burdens. Third, and relatedly, front-loaded contributions often are accompanied by unwieldy or stale conditions.
While these are persuasive reasons to limit the exemption, this step
would not be cost-free. As Part V showed, the exemption keeps the
tax law from interfering with a charity's choices about whether to
spend or save, and about how to invest their capital. In my view, the
overall assessment of the exemption-and how it compares with subsidies for donations-requires us to weigh these competing effects.
But are there other reasons to favor subsidies for donations instead
of endowment returns, or vice versa? Is one more likely to generate
satisfaction for donors? Is one more effective at pursuing distributional goals? Do these subsidies have different effects on labor
choices? Does one involve more administrative costs? This Part
briefly canvasses these issues and concludes that these factors do not
favor one type of subsidy over the other.

A.

Double Utility

So far, the analysis has focused on how charitable dollars are spent.
A different issue, which is the focus of this Section, is how these dollars are raised. As Louis Kaplow has observed, a distinctive feature of
charity is that it can enhance the welfare not only of the beneficiary,
but also of the donor, who finds satisfaction in making a gift. 10 5 In
other words, charity can offer "double utility."
Is the deduction more likely to generate this "double utility" than
the exemption? Arguably it is, since the donor is more immediately
involved in triggering the subsidy, and thus can derive satisfaction in
doing so. But the exemption offers an analogous benefit, so the two
subsidies are not especially different in this regard.
105Louis Kaplow, A Note on Subsidizing Gifts, 58 J. Pub. Econ. 469, 469 (1995).

Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law

TAX LAW REVIEW

1.

[Vol. 71:

Externalitiesfrom Gifts

Since charity is voluntary, donors make contributions because they
want to do so. This choice shows that these gifts enhance their welfare
too.

Charity offers an additional advantage when donors are wealthier
1°6
than beneficiaries: Resources flow to people who need them more.
Obviously, some charities induce more voluntary redistribution than
others. For example, a soup kitchen is stronger on this dimension
than a symphony.
Yet these advantages of charity are likely to be undersupplied. In
deciding how much to give, donors focus on their own welfare, undercounting the beneficiaries' welfare. 10 7 As Kaplow has observed,
the benefit to the beneficiary is a positive externality, which can justify
a subsidy. 10 8 Since the marginal subsidy is supposed to equal the marginal positive externality, the subsidy generally should equal the benefit to the beneficiary.
2.

Double Utility: Contributions Versus Investment Income

Charities obviously can be funded in various ways. Are some
sources more likely to generate "double utility"? Do gifts and endowment income differ on this dimension? If one is more likely to offer
this advantage, subsidizing it becomes correspondingly more
appealing.
To assess the likelihood of a "double utility" advantage, the first
question is whether beneficiaries are likely to care if charity comes
from gifts or endowment income. It is possible to imagine reasons
why this could matter to them. For instance, if donations are more
likely to be spent effectively, as argued above, beneficiaries should
prefer this funding source. They may also be concerned if they consider the funding source disreputable or morally compromising, although this issue can arise with either donations or endowment

106 Louis Kaplow, The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics 256 (2008) (describing
charity as "voluntary redistribution").
107 For example, assume a $100 gift would give a donor satisfaction worth $80, while
giving beneficiaries $100 of value. Even though the social gain from this expenditure
($180) exceeds the cost ($100), the donor will not spend this $100 if she focuses solely on
her own welfare ($80) and does not account for the beneficiary ($100).
108 Kaplow, note 106, at 253-54.
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income. 1°9 Aside from these issues, though, the source of a charity's
funding seems unlikely to loom large for beneficiaries. 110
From the funder's perspective, though, charitable contributions and
endowment income could well be different. In at least some cases,
contributions could provide a somewhat greater double utility advantage. This advantage depends on the donor's motive in supporting
charity, and also on the information donors have about how their gifts
have been invested.
a.

Altruistic Donors

For some donors, there should not be a difference. Their sole motive is for beneficiaries to receive support. These altruistic donors do
not care whether this support comes from them personally. Money
from other donors or the government is just as good. Since the source
of funding is irrelevant to altruistic donors, they do not care whether a
charity is funded with spendable gifts or endowment income.
b.

Warm Glow Donors

In contrast, other donors do care whether the money comes from
them personally. They derive particular satisfaction, which the literature calls "warm glow," from being the source. For donors to experience warm glow, two conditions presumably have to be satisfied:
First, they have to be the source of the money; second, they have to
know this is the case. For contributions of spendable money, this is
straightforward. Donors usually are aware of the contributions they
make.
For endowment income, however, these conditions are not always
met. A charity that does not receive any gifts-and is funded solely
with operating revenue-can still run a surplus. Any income earned
from investing this surplus cannot be traced to a donor. As a result,
no one experiences warm glow.
Alternatively, if this charity also receives spendable gifts, these gifts
can contribute to the surplus, and thus can generate endowment in109 For instance, universities have committees to consider whether a donor meets their
reputational standard. In addition, some members of university communities oppose investing the endowment in particular sectors or countries. For some, these divestment
movements are an effort to influence the targeted industry or nation. But for others, they
also can be an effort to distance the university from investments they consider morally
problematic.
110 For this reason, they will prefer charitable services to be funded by gifts or endowment income, instead of by operating revenue. For instance, students obviously favor
lower tuition, with the gap filled by philanthropic support. But whether the philanthropy
comes from spendable gifts or past endowment gifts is of less interest to them.
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come. But will the donors who gave these gifts know that their giving
helped generate this endowment income? What if the charity does
not tell them? Without information connecting their gifts to endowment income, donors do not know they are the source. Unlike gifts
themselves, then, income earned from gifts has a more attenuated
connection to donors.
In some cases, donors might assume they are the source, even if
they were never told that this was the case. In other cases, their connection to investment income is quite clear. For instance, donors who
give endowment gifts can experience warm glow not only from the
cash contributed, but also from the income this cash is expected to
generate. Even if projected returns do not generate warm glow, actual returns can do so, for instance, if the charity periodically updates
donors about the endowment's investment performance, as well as the
way the income was used. These reports are common among well-run
charities. Since the endowment is permanent, the donor's warm glow
can be refreshed in this way every year.11 1
In analyzing whether donations or endowment income is more
likely to generate warm glow, the assumption here is that warm glow
should be encouraged. Yet some commentators consider warm glow
too speculative to influence policy choices. They worry that donors do
not always enjoy giving. For instance, if someone does not want to
give, but feels awkward about saying "no," giving is merely the lesser
112
of two evils.
Yet this concern is overstated. Many donors obviously do enjoy giving. Those who do not can say "no" in ways that minimize awkwardness. 113 Moreover, even when charity is given to avoid negative
feelings, it is not unique. Some consumers buy expensive cars and
homes to "keep up with the Joneses." They do not want them, but are
avoiding the stigma of not having them. Since these choices usually

111 The social benefit from warm glow is greater if donors feel warm glow not only for
money they personally give, but also for government "matching money" triggered by their
gift. For instance, if a taxpayer in the 37% tax bracket gives $10,000 to charity, $3700
comes from the government (in the form of a reduced tax bill). It seems plausible that
donors would take satisfaction not only in the portion they personally finance, but also in
additional resources brought along with their gift.
112 Andreoni, note 28, at 26 ("Although you cringe when they [fundraisers] approach,
you give because saying no would be even more painful than saying yes. Hence, giving has
a marginally positive effect on your utility-but it was "the ask" that lowered it in the first
place."); see also Peter Diamond, Optimal Tax Treatment of Private Contributions for
Public Goods with and Without Warm Glow Preferences, 90 J. Pub Econ. 897, 909, 917
(2006).

113 For example, donors can express appreciation for the cause, as well as regret that
other commitments keep them from supporting it.
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are regarded as enhancing welfare, and thus are considered relevant in
114
policy analysis, the same standard should apply to charity.
In any event, the bottom line is that endowment income is sometimes a source of satisfaction to warm glow donors, but not always.
As a result, endowment income may be somewhat less effective than
contributions at promoting double utility. This difference is another
reason to focus subsidies on contributions, instead of endowment income. But the magnitude of this advantage is hard to assess and may
well be modest. As a result, this consideration is substantially less important than the governance issues discussed above.
B.

Distribution

A familiar advantage of charity, noted above, is voluntary redistribution from wealthy donors to needy beneficiaries. Subsidies can enhance welfare by encouraging this redistribution. Are subsidies for
donations more likely to promote redistribution than subsidies for endowment income? The answer is not clear.
1.

Type of Charity

Four variables affect the distributional impact of charitable subsidies. The first is the mission of the subsidized charity. Charities with
needier beneficiaries are more likely to advance distributional goals.
On this dimension, soup kitchens are better than orchestras.
Are charities with endowments systematically more (or less) likely
to have needy beneficiaries? Most charities do not have significant
endowments, 115 and there is no obvious pattern among those that do.
Some are quite likely to help low-income beneficiaries (such as hospitals, the Gates Foundation, and the Red Cross), while others are not
(such as cultural institutions), and some have a blended mission (such
as universities, which fund both financial aid and research). There116
fore, it is hard to generalize.
114 Donors can be motivated not only by altruism and warm glow, but also by more
tangible benefits. Some seek recognition, an enhanced reputation, access to the charity's
managers or other donors, or other "exchange" benefits. In contributing either spendable
money or endowments, donors can negotiate for exchange benefits.
115 Andreoni, note 28, at 3.
116 Endowments can affect distribution in a different sense. Charities with large endowments are likely to outcompete other charities. For example, some critics argue that this
inequality can lead to overconcentration of talent in a small number of universities.
Jonathan R. Cole, The Great American University: Its Rise to Preeminence, Its Indispensable National Role, Why It Must Be Protected 486 (2009) ("too much of a good thing").
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Economic Incidence

A second variable affecting the distributional impact of charitable
subsidies is its economic incidence. Are charitable subsidies helping

beneficiaries or other stakeholders? For example, if a soup kitchen
uses extra resources to pay higher salaries, employees benefit more
than beneficiaries. 117 As a result, agency costs can divert charities
from their redistributive missions. As noted above, subsidies for donations can piggyback on donor monitoring more effectively than subsidies for endowment income. As a result, they may be somewhat less
likely to be diverted, but the magnitude of this distributional advantage is hard to assess.
3.

Donor's Income

Third, the degree of redistribution from charity (and thus from the

charitable subsidies that encourage it) depends not only on the beneficiary, but also on the donor. For instance, when very poor people
help moderately poor people, the redistribution cuts the wrong way.
At the same time, when extremely wealthy donors help upper middle-

income beneficiaries, distributional goals are advanced, at least to an
extent. To make a reliable judgment about the distributional impact
of charity, then, we need to know the source of the funds.

Does endowment income tend to come from wealthier people than
donations? Once again, a generalization on this issue is not easy. On
one hand, donors who give endowments are likely to be wealthier, on
average, than donors who give spendable money. On the other hand,
endowments-and thus endowment income-do not come only from
endowment gifts. They also can come from an operating surplus. If
this is the case, the surplus's source is hard to ascertain, since money is
fungible. We know revenue exceeded costs. But if some revenue
came from wealthy people, and some did not, how do we know which
revenue was invested, and which was spent?
117 Likewise, if a subsidy allows a donor to reduce her giving (for example, because she
can use the subsidy to get to her "target" contribution), the donor, rather than the beneficiary, is helped by the subsidy. Yet the evidence suggests that subsidies do not usually
"crowd out" giving in this way. See, e.g., Julia Bredtman, Does Government Spending
Crowd Out Voluntary Labor and Donations?, IZA World of Labor 1 (Sept. 2016), https://
wol.iza.org/uploads/articles/299/pdfs/does-government-spending-crowd-out-voluntary-labor-and-donations.pdf ("The empirical evidence investigating whether public spending
crowds out private charitable donations is mixed. A number of studies find significant but
small crowding-out effects, while others find no effects or even evidence of a crowding-in
effect."); James Andreoni, An Experimental Test of the Public Goods Crowding Out Hypothesis, 83 Am. Econ. Rev. 1317 (1993) (experimental test showing that crowding out is
incomplete).
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Benefits to Donor

Fourth, in assessing the distributional impact of charity (and charitable subsidies), we should consider the benefits not only to beneficiaries, but also to donors. For example, donors experience warm
glow, and also use subsidies to reduce their tax bill. Indeed, the government's distributional analysis of the charitable deduction focuses
on who claims it, rather than on who benefits from charitable work
that is funded. This focus is unsatisfying, since it misses the main goal
of the charitable subsidy, which is to help beneficiaries. But even so,
distribution of the tax benefit is part of the picture.
On this dimension, the subsidy for donations under current law
does not fare especially well. The charitable deduction is upside down
in familiar ways. It is available only to itemizers, is more valuable in
high tax brackets, and is especially generous for appreciated securities.
Yet these upside down features are not inherent in a subsidy for donations, which could be structured as a credit instead. 118
To sum up, charitable subsidies are likely to advance distributional
goals, but the magnitude of this advantage depends on the type of
charity that is subsidized, the incidence of the subsidy, and the source
of the charity's funds. On these dimensions, subsidizing donations
does not have an obvious distributional advantage over subsidizing
endowment returns, and vice versa.
Even if there are differences, we presumably can address them with
offsetting adjustments in the tax and transfer system. "1 9 Therefore,
although distribution is part of the case for charitable subsidies, it
does not loom large in the comparison between the exemption and
deduction.
C.

Deadweight Loss

In deciding whether to subsidize donations or endowment returns,
we should also ask whether one type of subsidy creates less deadweight loss than the other. As with distribution, there is no clear winner on this issue.
1.

Labor and Savings Effects

In principle, either subsidy can alleviate labor or savings distortions.
For example, exempting endowment income mitigates distortions in a
charity's investment choices, as noted above.
118 See Schizer, note 10.

119 Kaplow, note 106, at 247 n.40 (discussing distribution-neutral
adjustments).
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In a somewhat different way, the charitable deduction also can ease
labor and savings distortions. For example, taxpayers who donate
their last dollars of earnings to charity pay no tax on these earnings,
and thus have reason to work and save more. 120 Likewise, taxpayers
who contribute their first dollars to charity also have added motivation to work or save, but for a different reason. Their contributions
leave them with less money, so they work or save more to fund more
12 1
consumption.
The other side of the coin, though, is that subsidies are funded with
higher taxes, which discourage work and saving. 122 The net of these
various effects determines labor and savings distortions. As Kaplow
has shown, if a subsidy is implemented in a distribution-neutral wayso its distributional effects are offset, on average, by adjustments in
123
tax rates-the distortions do not change.
For instance, consider the treatment of a taxpayer who gives 1% of
her income to charity under two different regimes. In the first, the gift
to charity is not deductible and the tax rate is 36.63%. If she earns
$1000 and makes a nondeductible $10 gift to charity, she pays $366.30
in tax and has $633.70 for consumption (including $10 for charity).
In the second regime, the gift to charity is deductible, and the rate is
increased to 37% to fund this subsidy. As the table below shows, the
result is the same. With $1000 of income, she contributes $10 to charity. But since this contribution is deductible, she has only $990 in taxable income, which is taxed at 37%. So once again, her tax bill is
$366.30 and she has $633.70 for consumption (including $10 for
124
charity).

120 Diamond, note 112, at 900 (noting that higher income workers in his model "are
willing to undertake a more arduous job because of the increase in the public good that
they perceive from the higher contribution they make when holding a higher paying job.
That is, if the workers care enough about the public good it is not necessary to give higher
consumption in order to induce employment at a more difficult job").
121 Kaplow, note 106, at 255 n.13. Note that the dynamic is somewhat different if people
give to charity because they derive unusually little marginal benefit from consumption.
122

Id.

Id. ("A subsidy on [charitable contributions] would be accompanied by an increase
in marginal labor income tax rates, which has the effect of raising the net cost of earning
income to spend on [charity] that just offsets the extent to which expenditures on [charity]
have a higher marginal utility than before.")
124 A similar analysis applies to the exemption for endowment returns. It allows donors
to support charities more cost-effectively by giving endowment gifts, instead of spendable
gifts, as noted above. This possibility might encourage a donor to save or work more, since
marginal earnings yield a greater benefit (that is, more income for the charity). But to
fund the subsidy, the tax rate needs to be higher. If the package is distribution-neutral, the
labor and savings effects for donors (on average) should not change.
123
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TABLE 1
Gross .

Charitable

Taxable

Tax

Contribution Income

Rate

Tax

By Taxpayer

Consumption

Regime

Income

No Deduction

$1000

$10

$1000

36.63%

$366.30

$623.70

Deduction

$1000

$10

$990

37%

$366.30

$623.70

Of course, these regimes are no longer equivalent for taxpayers
whose charitable giving is either more or less than average. For taxpayers who give nothing to charity, the regime with a charitable deduction is less favorable; the deduction does not help them, while the
rate is higher. 125 In contrast, for taxpayers who give extra charity, this
regime is more favorable, since the deduction more than offsets the
126
higher rate.
Although a distribution-neutral charitable subsidy should not affect
labor and savings choices of donors, it can influence beneficiaries. For
instance, if a charity funds some of a beneficiary's consumption, she
has less incentive to work and save. 127 On the other hand, if a charity
enhances a beneficiary's human capital (for example, by funding her

education), she may respond by working more.12 8 These effects arise
because beneficiaries receive more resources. Yet the source of these
resources-and, in particular, whether they come from donations or
endowment income-should not matter. On this dimension, subsidies
for donations and endowment returns have similar effects.
2.

Administrative and FundraisingCosts

In comparing how these subsidies contribute to deadweight loss, we
also should consider administrative costs. For each subsidy, the government has to craft and enforce rules, and taxpayers need to comply
with them. In each case, lines need to be drawn. For instance, we
have to distinguish between deductible charity and nondeductible private benefits, as well as between tax-exempt income and unrelated
business taxable income. These line-drawing costs probably are comparable for both subsidies.
125For instance, this taxpayer pays $400 in tax on earning $1000, and has $600 for consumption. But if the rate were only 39.6%, and there was no charitable deduction, she
would pay $396 and could consume $604.
126 For instance, consider a taxpayer who contributes 2% to charity. With a charitable
deduction, this taxpayer is taxed on only $980 of her $1000 of earnings, and a 40% tax (of
$392) leaves her with $588 to consume. Without the charitable deduction, she would pay
$396 in tax, while giving $20 in charity, and thus would have only $584 to consume.
127Kaplow, note 106, at 250.

128 Unsubsidized charity can have these effects, and a subsidy can magnify them by increasing the charity they receive.
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Likewise, the underlying behavior also can generate administrative
costs. For example, nonprofits hire fundraisers and investment advisors, and nonprofit managers invest time working with them. Again,
it is not obvious that one of these subsidies generates more costs than
12 9
the other.
VII.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This Article has three main policy implications. First, although the
deduction for charitable contributions and exemption of a charity's
investment income use a similar approach, relying on private parties
instead of government officials to allocate funds, they have very different effects.
Second, compared with the deduction, the exemption has an important weakness: By favoring endowment gifts over spendable gifts, it
discourages donors to operating charities from redirecting their giving
when needs change or management fails to deliver. While these costs
are a reason to repeal or scale back the exemption, this solution creates a new problem: The saving and investment choices of charities
are distorted.
Third, these distortions can be avoided by addressing the governance issues a different way: allowing donors to earn a tax-free return
for charities on their own, without turning assets over to an operating
charity. Yet this solution can exacerbate other problems, such as
agency costs in private foundations.
The Deduction and Exemption: Siblings, But Not Twins
At first blush, the deduction and exemption appear to be quite similar. Each relies on private parties, instead of government officials, to
choose which causes to support, monitor quality, and decide whether
to spend money now or later. This limited role of government officials contrasts markedly with the way most federal dollars are spent.
Yet notwithstanding these similarities, this Article breaks new
ground in showing that the deduction and exemption have quite different effects on the governance of nonprofits. Although both subsidies delegate decisions to private parties-notably, donors, the board,
and professional managers-these tax rules affect the balance of
power among these groups in different ways. The deduction strengthens the hand of donors (by authorizing them to choose which charities
benefit from the subsidy), while the exemption increases the influence
A.

129 Indeed, there is considerable overlap. For instance, if the charitable deduction is
repealed, the exemption would still motivate them to raise money for their endowment,
and thus to maintain a fundraising infrastructure to do so.
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of managers (by encouraging donors to turn over assets to them). By
favoring endowment gifts over spendable gifts, the exemption reduces
a donor's ability to monitor and influence managers after she has
given her gift.
In addition, another difference between the deduction and exemption already is familiar: the effect on a nonprofit's decision to spend
now or later. As other commentators have observed, the exemption
eliminates the tax incentive a charity otherwise would have under an
income tax to accelerate spending. 130 The exemption also spares charities from making tax-motivated investment decisions.
The bottom line, then, is that if Congress wishes to commit a particular share of its budget to this sort of nondiscretionary funding for
charities-and there are good reasons for it to do so-the effects can
vary significantly, depending on how much Congress allocates to the
deduction, on one hand, and the exemption, on the other. This balance affects the relative influence of managers and donors, as well as
the incentives of charities to save.
B.

Repealing or Scaling Back the Exemption

The deduction has two advantages over the exemption, which suggest that scarce subsidy dollars should be focused on the deduction,
instead of the exemption. First, the charitable deduction uses a more
reliable measure of a charity's social value: the willingness of donors
to commit their own money. In contrast, the exemption of endowment income uses a less dependable proxy: a surplus that is invested
successfully. A surplus is not always a good sign, since managers may
horde cash to protect their jobs, and skillful investing does not necessarily correlate with effectiveness at the charity's mission.
A second disadvantage of the exemption is that, unlike the deduction, it favors endowments over spendable gifts. While endowments
are appropriate (and even essential) in some cases-for instance, to
provide stability for a multi-year charitable initiative-endowments
also have disadvantages, which suggest that the tax law should not put
a thumb on the scale for them. Specifically, when donors turn assets
over to an operating charity, they can no longer redirect these resources if the mission becomes less relevant or managers underperform. In addition, donors usually impose restrictions, which
can become dated over time.
Obviously, Congress can eliminate this tax advantage by repealing
the exemption. A charity's investment income can be taxed at the
130 Halperin, note 18, at 125; Galle, note 9, at 1159.
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same rate that governs donors. 131 This new tax would mitigate the
which arise from favoring
governance distortions, described 13above,
2
endowments over spendable gifts.
Yet even as taxing charities solves some problems, it creates others.
Charities would begin making tax-motivated investment decisions. In
addition, as other commentators have observed, they would have a tax
incentive to spend currently, instead of saving.
In managing this trade-off, Congress does not face the binary choice
of either repealing the exemption or preserving it in its current form.
An intermediate option is to tax nonprofits at a reduced rate. For
instance, if the rate on a donors' investments is 23.8%, a 10% rate for
nonprofits could be a viable compromise, reducing (though not eliminating) the tax advantage of endowments, while having only a modest
effect on a charity's saving and investment choices. 133 In setting this
rate, Congress should consider the severity of the relevant distortion.
For instance, if governance issues are a particular concern, the rate for
nonprofits should be close to the rate for donors. But if distortions in
charities' saving and investment decisions loom especially large, the
rate should be closer to zero.
More generally, assuming we continue to use an income tax, the
case for exempting endowment income is mixed at best. Allowing
charities to make undistorted savings and investment choices is appealing, but favoring endowment gifts-and thus undercutting the
ability of donors to monitor managers and reevaluate charities over
time-raises concerns. On balance, there is a good argument for scaling back the exemption.
Finally, if Congress chooses to rely less on the exemption in subsidizing charity-and more on the deduction-it should address some
of the deduction's familiar limitations under current law. For instance, since the deduction is more generous to taxpayers in high
brackets, it could be replaced with a tax credit, which provides the
131 In 2018, use of the corporate rate, which is 21%, would not establish this parity with
individuals, whose top rate is 37%.
132 Taxing nonprofits has another advantage as well. As I have argued elsewhere, this
step could serve as a useful component of corporate tax reform. The tax on corporate
profits is harder to collect from corporations than for shareholders because corporations
can use an avoidance strategy-shifting profits abroad-that is not available to shareholders. One way to block this avoidance strategy is to tax shareholders, instead of corporations. But this solution is not available for nonprofit shareholders if the exemption spares
them from tax. Repealing (or scaling back) the exemption would unblock this avenue to
corporate tax reform. David M. Schizer, Between Scylla and Charybdis: Taxing Corporations or Shareholders (Or Both), 116 Colum. L. Rev. 1849 (2016).
133 In addition, Congress can look for ways of taxing nonprofits that minimize the distortions in their savings and investment decisions. For example, an up-front lump sum tax is
less likely to affect how much the charity chooses to save or how it invests those savings. I

am grateful to Brian Galle for this observation.
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same government match to both low- and high-income donors. Likewise, a uniform tax benefit could be provided, regardless of whether a
donor contributes cash or appreciated property. Since these and other
lfimitations of the deduction are well understood, and I have considered them elsewhere, 134 this Article does not focus on them.
C.

Extending Tax-Free Treatment to Donors

Instead of repealing or scaling back the deduction, there is another
way to address this rule's governance costs. Since the goal is to conform the treatment of endowments and spendable gifts-or, at least to
narrow the difference-there are two ways to do so. One is to increase the tax burden on endowment gifts, as discussed above. The
other is to reduce the tax burden on spendable gifts.
To ease this burden, Congress could allow a donor to earn tax-free
returns for charities on her own, so she would no longer have to turn
over assets to operating charities in order to access this tax benefit.
This would be the case, for instance, of Congress replaced the income
tax with a consumption tax. After this fundamental reform, a donor
would pay no tax on investment returns. Since donors and charities
would be taxed the same way, endowment gifts would no longer be
taxed more favorably than spendable gifts. As a result, donors would
no longer have a tax motivation to give endowments and would do so
only if they considered this the best way to support a charity.
Yet a consumption tax is a broader response than necessary to eliminate the tax advantage of endowments. 13 5 A narrower alternative is
to preserve the tax on other investment returns, while allowing taxfree returns on investments committed to charity, even if taxpayers
have not yet chosen which operating charity will receive these funds.
In other words, once taxpayers contribute money to a vehicle that can
fund only charities (or administrative expenses of supporting charities), investments in this vehicle would grow tax-free, and thus would
be taxed as favorably as the endowment of an operating charity.
Private foundations and donor-advised funds are examples of this
sort of vehicle under current law. But as noted above, they are not
taxed as favorably as an operating charity's endowment. For instance,
a private foundation's investments are subject to a modest tax, as well
as to strict requirements about how much must be distributed. ContriSee generally Schizer, note 10.
consumption tax offers other advantages, which are beyond this Article's scope.
See, e.g., Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax Over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1413 (2006).
134

135 A
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butions to private foundations also are taxed less favorably than con36
tributions to public charities.'
While donor-advised funds avoid these limits, since they ordinarily
qualify as public charities, this benefit comes at a cost: Compared
with a private foundation, a donor-advised fund is supposed to offer
the donor less control over how funds are allocated. In theory, the
donor is not a decisionmaker, and can offer only advice about which
charities to support. As a practical matter, this understates the donor's role. But if donors play a more robust role than the tax law
allows, they are assuming some tax risk. For instance, if these funds
are treated as private foundations that do not satisfy the relevant tax
rules, they could be subject to significant penalties.
To eliminate the tax advantage of endowments over spendable gifts,
Congress could authorize donor-advised funds to allow donors explicitly to decide which charities receive the funds. Or alternatively, Congress could ease the onerous rules that currently apply to private
foundations, so they are treated more like public charities.
In doing so, Congress would eliminate the tax advantage of endowment gifts to operating charities, since the tax treatment would be the
same if donors instead contributed to foundations, and then decided
every year which charities to support with their investment return.
Some donors would prefer this approach, since it allows them the flexibility to redirect giving, while others would still give endowment gifts
(for example, if they were persuaded that the operating charity
needed the stability associated with permanent funding).
While this would be an improvement, two important caveats are in
order. First, broadening the tax-free treatment of endowments in this
way would have a revenue cost. As a result, the efficiency gains from
doing so must be compared with the efficiency cost of making up this
revenue with other taxes (for example, higher rates on wages or on
other investments).
Second, although leveling the playing field between endowments
and spendable gifts mitigates governance problems within operating
charities, it can exacerbate them within private foundations or donoradvised funds. For example, if donors depend on professional managers or philanthropic advisors to allocate grants from their foundations,
these professionals might seek to advance their own preferences and
interests, instead of those of the donor. As a result, the governance
issues might shift from operating charities to foundations. Again,
there are no bulletproof solutions.

136

See Subsection IV.A.2.
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CONCLUSION

The deduction for charitable contributions and the exemption of
endowment returns share a unique feature: Government officials apply very general criteria to determine whether charities are eligible,
and do not decide how much each charity should receive. These nondiscretionary allocations safeguard the independence of nonprofits,
encouraging them to experiment, compete, and advance causes that
do not (yet) command widespread political support.
Although this independence has advantages, it has costs as well.
How do we know public money is not being wasted? Is it going to
worthwhile causes? Are nonprofits advancing these goals efficiently?
Or are managers merely pursuing their own interests? There is a tension between giving nonprofits room to experiment, on one hand, and
ensuring that they spend wisely, on the other.
This Article breaks new ground by showing that the deduction resolves this governance trade-off more successfully than the exemption
for two reasons. First, the deduction uses a more reliable measure of
a charity's social value: the willingness of donors to commit their own
money, instead of the ability of a charity to generate a surplus. Second, the deduction empowers donors to monitor nonprofit managers,
while the exemption sometimes undercuts this monitoring.
Therefore, if Congress is going to rely on private decisionmakers to
choose which charities receive public support, the deduction is a better mechanism than the exemption. Yet eliminating the exemption is
not cost-free, since it keeps the tax law from influencing whether charities should spend or save, and how they invest their capital. On balance, there is a good argument for either scaling back the exemption
or for allowing donors to invest tax-free on their own in order to support charities.
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